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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
NEWS TREATMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT: LANGUAGE SELECTION,
IDEOLOGICAL DIRECTIONS, AND PUBLIC SUPPORT
In an increasingly diverse media landscape, how much of the ideological trends seen
in current news reporting affect coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court? This work examines
two different aspects of the Court's activities, their decisions and the confirmation hearings
of Court nominees, analyzing what factors, if any, lead to differences in coverage language.
Finally, through the use of a survey experiment, I analyze whether these differences in
language, in combination with positive symbolic imagery, affect attitudes toward the
institution. This work provides a novel consideration of whether the Court is subject to the
same ideological slant found in coverage of other institutions, as well as the potential impact
of such language on the Court's support.
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CHAPTER 1: The Reluctant Court Takes Center Stage
Reporters over the years have suggested that coverage of the Supreme Court is
unique in terms of how the media portray the institution. Some argue that because of the
nature of how the Court operates, in contrast to the other two branches of government, it is
far less likely to be dragged into the hyper-political arena. One such journalist, long time
Court reporter Linda Greenhouse of The New York Times goes so far as to say Court
reporting is “almost a formula story: The Supreme Court upheld, struck down, did x, y, z…
It’s not real hard to do. It’s almost a science” (Greenhouse 1996, 1537, 1643).
However, there are many reasons to challenge this notion. First, the Supreme Court
does hand down controversial decisions that may rile the public through the media’s
coverage. Americans are unlikely to read decisions themselves and rely on their outlet of
choice to synthesize them. In reality, that may be dangerous for the Court. Major civil
liberties case like that of Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized gay marriage, drew cheers from
proponents of the decision and jeers from those against it. As will be discussed in the
following chapters, this may very well be a consequence of the coverage given to these
decisions. It also suggests some decisions are not as easy to pop in the cannister as others.
There are, indeed, straight forward decisions that gain general approval (or more likely
indifference). Nevertheless, when a controversial decision is passed down and a reporter is
tasked with discussing potential consequences, how do they choose what to focus on? What
language of the opinion do they hone in, and why? Do they acknowledge the ideological
nature of the actors sitting on the bench, or maintain a “legalistic” portrayal of impartial
actors with merely different legal philosophies?
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This leads to the second reason as to why media coverage is less formulaic than
Greenhouse suggests. The media landscape is ever changing and expanding, as traditional
outlets like The New York Times now share coverage with outlets that appear steeped in
ideological language no matter what they are covering. When Greenhouse wrote her analysis
of Court reporting in 1996, both Fox News and MSNBC were in their infancy. The internet
was also fairly new and nowhere near the absolute necessity it is today for most Americans.
These are important changes in terms of where Americans receive their information from,
including information about the Court (Peffley, Denison and Taylor 2020).
One last major development worthy of note, to push back a bit on how formulaic
Court coverage is, the Trump presidency ushered in three new Federalist Society judges.
With the controversial nominations of Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and to a lesser extent Coney
Barrett, Americans were sharply divided on their confirmations. For many liberal Americans,
their fears came to fruition in the 2022 term. The decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol
Association vs. Bruen expanded 2nd Amendment protections, a controversial opinion as
Americans are witnessing an increase in gun related deaths in recent years (Gramlich 2022).
Secondly, attention to the Supreme Court is up due to another controversial opinion in
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. The decision, and an earlier draft leaked to the
press, received a great deal of media attention. Due to how much it breaks from established
precedent in Roe v. Wade. With these developments, it seems more eyes are turning to news
coverage of the Court and its activities, while public support for the institution is
plummeting.
This dissertation works to discuss many of the issues just mentioned through three
separate empirical chapters, all discussing a different aspect of the relationship between the
2

Court and the media.. The first of which focuses on what language the media uses in their
coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court. I create a unique dictionary of politicized terms a using
a computer assisted text program to assess how different ideological outlets cover ideological
decisions, and under what conditions. Chapter 3 focuses on the news cycle surrounding the
nomination of Justice Kavanaugh. Accused of sexual assault as a younger man, followed by a
performative display of anger in the aftermath of the accusation, it provides an interesting
example of how the news cycle shifts, as well as an analysis as to the language used in
coverage of the nomination differed by outlet ideology. Finally, the third empirical chapter
attempts to challenge “positivity theory.” Following in the footsteps of recent research on
the psychology of motivated reason, some judicial scholars suggest that exposure to positive
symbolism surrounding the Court has allowed the institution to maintain popular support.
Relying on responses to an online survey experiment, I argue that this may be tempered
based on the language in coverage that accompanies this imagery. Can the Court’s public
support really stand up, regardless of what images accompany it, if the rhetoric itself it
politicized or negative?
Together, these ideas connect in important ways. For instance, the Court issues an
opinion or new personnel join the bench. The media opt how to cover these events. The
public then relies on the media for an understanding of what is happening. Whether the
media is able to influence people’s perceptions of political events is at the center of a
constant debate. The Court has, for many years, been able to stay out of the fray (Davis
1994). Now, it has been thrust into a new spotlight. Thus, this connection is vital to
understanding whether the Court can keep a strong public image, and consequently, whether
their decisions will be properly implemented.
3

CHAPTER 2: Distorting the Court?: Politicized Language in Media Portrayals of the
Supreme Court
In successive days at the end of the 2014-2015 term, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two
of the most controversial decisions in recent history: King v. Burwell, which found the
Affordable Care Act, a lightning rod for polarized politics, constitutional; and Obergefell v.
Hodges, which struck down state bans on same-sex marriage, effectively legalizing gay
marriage across the country. In just two days, the media was flooded with stories of support,
outrage, adoration and denial. Research on the Supreme Court has largely neglected the link
between the Court’s decisions and the media that chooses how to cover them. Yet, in an era
of increasing diversification of media, it is important to consider how the media covers the
Court in different situations. In other words, it is imperative to consider how Americans
receive their information about the Court, as well as what language is used to describe the
Court and its actions. I seek to further this understanding through a consideration of
“politicized” language; a focus on both the ideological leanings of the justices, which would
suggest they are merely politicians in robes, as well as the Court’s conflictual relationships
with other institutions and political actors. If the media is focusing on such content, even in
specific contexts, its reporting on the Court could dramatically alter the public’s perceptions
of the Supreme Court and its actions.
Most Americans doubtless rely on the media for information regarding the Court, as
limited as that coverage is (Slotnik and Segal 1998; Spill and Oxley 2003). However, not all
media outlets are created equal, as differences in format and ideological grounding may
accentuate certain biases for conflict inherent to the media as a whole. How do various
media outlets differ in their portrayals of the Court, and more specifically, under what
4

circumstances does a more politicized portrayal of the Court occur? This research addresses
the variation in the language of Supreme Court coverage across various types of news
outlets, focusing on an ideologically diverse collection of organizations in print, broadcast
and digital formats. Using computer assisted text analysis, I examine the language disparity
across these outlets and the use of politically charged terminology, with substantial emphasis
on the impact consensus and ideological claims on media presentations of the Supreme
Court.
2.1 Coverage of the Court
The Supreme Court’s influence on the public relies on two distinct linkages: media to
public and Court to media. The former is the basis for public understanding of the Court
and factors heavily into the literature on both broad and specific support. The latter linkage
of Court to media, however, is a largely neglected relationship that forms the basis for what
Court content is ultimately selected, presented and emphasized by the media for public
consumption. Of particular interest here is the language used to describe the decision
making of the Supreme Court and what politicized elements are emphasized under certain
conditions. This section briefly discusses the extant literature regarding media coverage of
the Court and its potential impact on citizens’ evaluations of the institution.
There is no question that the media plays the most pivotal role in providing
information about the Supreme Court to the public, and consequently, impacting public
support for the institution. Most Americans lack the ability, or interest, to decipher the
legalese of constitutional law or the intricacies of the legal realm, and unsurprisingly, have
fairly little knowledge of the Court (Kritzer 2001). Therefore, since the public has little direct
access to the workings of the Supreme Court, and even less expertise on the law, most
5

Americans must get their information about the Court, as limited as it may be, through the
filter of the news media.
The media’s role in educating the public about the Supreme Court appears to be
severely lacking. Most research in the area of Supreme Court news coverage concludes that
the institution is often poorly covered, if it is covered at all (Hetherington and Smith 2007;
O’Callaghan and Dukes 1992; Solomine 1980; Tarpley 1984). While some newspapers and
newsmagazines often provide thorough and comparatively detailed coverage of Court
decisions (Solimine 1980; Tarpley 1984; O’Callaghan and Dukes 1992; Spill and Oxley 2003),
much of the reporting on the Court, particularly in television news, is shallow and devoid of
detail, perhaps due to the constraints of the journalistic profession and complexities of law
(Newland 1964; Davis 1994; Slotnick and Segal 1998; Spill and Oxley 2003; Davis 2011).
Furthermore, these differences in outlet types can lead to more or less favorable evaluations
of the institution, with more traditional outlets, like those in newspapers or network news,
providing coverage that corresponds with higher evaluations of the institution (Bartels and
Johnston 2012; Johnston and Bartels 2010). The privacy of the Court’s deliberations fails to
provide the moments of evident conflict the media undeniably covets, particularly in
television reporting, further impeding more widespread coverage of the institution (Davis
2011; Hetherington and Smith 2007; O’Callaghan and Dukes 1992). As O’Callaghan and
Dukes (1992) argue, “High public esteem of the Supreme Court is based on an incomplete
look at the court’s workload” (195), but what few cases are covered extensively in the media
offer various prisms through which to look.
Despite the dearth of Court coverage compared to other institutions and actors,
what is covered can have significant impacts on public perceptions of the Court. Some argue
6

the Court preserves a high level of institutional support due to its “mystique of legality”
promoted by the media at large (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2003; Scheb and Lyons 2000).
Because the Court is not as transparent as other institutions, conducting its business behind
closed doors, the public is not exposed to what would be considered the most “political”
elements of the judiciary (e.g., disagreements, bargaining), thus preserving high levels of
institutional support (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Mondak
and Smithey 1997). Additionally, some posit that the public is conditioned to be supportive
of the Court through sparse coverage and a consistent portrayal of the institution’s
“legalistic” attributes (Casey 1974; Baird and Gangl 2006), emphasizing an objective and fair
Court (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968; Casey 1974). Alternatively, it has also been argued that
greater knowledge of the Court leads to greater support of the institution (Caldeira 1986;
Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Caldeira 2009b; Gibson and Caldeira 2009c).
In understanding the media’s role in perceptions of the Court, an immediate
contradiction unfolds: if public support of the institution is high because of its supposed
mystique and lack of transparent political bargaining, as has been suggested (Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse 1995), why is it that greater knowledge of the institution, and inevitably a
better understanding of its political attributes, leads to greater support for the Court
(Ramirez 2008)? Perhaps the best answer to this question lies not in mere exposure to the Court through
news media, but rather in the portrayal of the Court through different media organizations. While an
individual may consume a great amount of information about the Court, it is also possible,
and in the current media environment highly likely, that much of this coverage abandons the
“legalistic,” non-ideological language thought to preserve support. Differences in mere outlet
types can lead to greater or less favorable evaluations of the institution, with more traditional
7

outlets, like those in newspapers or network news, providing coverage that corresponds with
higher evaluations of the institution (Bartels and Johnston 2012; Johnston and Bartels 2010).
Thus, while it has been argued time and again that a positive, supportive portrayal of the
Court is critical to maintenance of widespread public support (Baird and Gangl 2006;
Nicholson and Howard 2003; Ramirez 2008), the media’s preferences for notable conflict in
Court reporting (Johnson and Socker 2012; Vinson and Errter 2002; Zilis 2015), areas of
significant political controversy (Evans and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012; Tarpley 1980) and the
profit motives that inevitably lead to ideological biases among many outlets (Gentzkow and
Shapiro 2010) certainly provide attractive opportunities to politicize the Court through
greater attention to both intra- and inter-branch relationships.
Finally, a recent study by Hitt and Searles (2018) finds that the way the Supreme
Court is presented in the media can have dramatic effects on how people view the
institution. After analyzing more than 1,000 broadcast transcripts over a two decade period,
they find that the media narrative as a whole has largely shifted from a more “principled”
examination of the Court toward more of a “game-framed” narrative that focuses less on
legality and basic facts of decisions and more toward terms like “battle” and “fight.” The
consequences of this appear to be drastic, and as the media shift more toward this latter
narrative, support for the Court drops, suggesting that tone changes do have an impact on
the legitimacy of the institution.
While valuable work has been done to examine the linkage between the media and
the public in relation to the Court, research on the media’s portrayal of the Court and its
output is comparatively sparse. Bolstering our knowledge of this linkage is vital to a more
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complete understanding of how the media shapes perceptions of political institutions and
how citizens make legitimacy arguments.
2.2 Conflict, Bias and Portrayals of the Supreme Court
I argue that the market-driven media landscape will alter its portrayal of the Court
depending on observable conflict cues and ideological disagreement with Court decisions.
First, in those instances in which the media can find observable conflict among the members
of the Court or other governmental actors, the presence of politicized language regarding the
Court will become more prominent. Second, the ideological biases found in many American
news outlets can impact coverage of the Court, particularly when an ideological clash arises
between the outlet and the decision of the Court. Third, the more ideologically extreme the
outlet, the more likely they are to politicize disliked decisions. As more Americans turn to
ideologically-driven sources for their coverage of the Court and other political information
(Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010), it is crucial to understand how these outlets differ in their
coverage of the Court.
The mass media tends to focus on stories of conflict, carrying the mantra “if it
bleeds it leads” metaphorically into the political arena (Vinson and Errter 2002). This leads
to a disproportionate amount of attention placed on certain conflictual elements of the
institution, most notably its “actions, factions and interactions” (Johnson and Socker 2012).
Though most of the Supreme Court’s conflict is developed behind closed doors, hindering
access for the media and public alike, each decision handed down by the Court comes with a
clear indicator of consensus, with unanimous decisions signaling strong consensus and split
decisions signaling greater dissensus (Zilis 2015). As the leading indicator of consensus on
the Court, the size of the Court’s majority may also lead the media to alter its portrayal of the
9

decision, ostensibly rewarding the Court for unanimous decisions through legalistic coverage
and punishing the Court for dissensus through heightened politicized language. I treat the
concepts of consensus and dissensus as mirror opposites, unanimity and complete discord.
This leads to the first hypothesis,
H11: SC decisions with lower levels of consensus will lead to news coverage with greater levels of
politicized language than decisions with higher levels of consensus.
Additionally, though ideological news bias may be contributing to politicized
portrayals of the Court in its own right, it is more likely that these biases are affected by the
relative output of the Court. Though the Court may be viewed as a liberal or conservative
institution based on its membership, a point that is not always necessarily obvious, each
individual decision offers a unique opportunity to assign ideological alliance at a given time.
Rather than merely celebrating ideological victories when the Court decides in an agreeable
fashion, ideological outlets may be more likely to emphasize the political attributes of the
Court when a disagreeable decision is made. Counter to the idea of a generally supportive news
media that offers positive treatments of the Court, I instead suggest this positivity is
constrained by disagreement with individual decisions. In other words, by providing a
politicized treatment of disliked decisions, disagreeable outlets may in fact be attempting to
delegitimize the decision. Ideological posturing and politicized tone on the other hand may
be dampened when attempting to bolster the legitimacy of a supported decision. These
potential differences in language among ideologically disparate outlets may lead to vastly
disparate perceptions of the Court, its actions and the fairness of the institution. This leads
to my second hypothesis,
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H2: Decision disagreement between a news outlet and a SC decision will lead to news coverage with
greater levels of politicized language than news coverage with no decision disagreement.
With an understanding that an individual’s news outlet selection may greatly
influence their perception of the Supreme Court, it is also important to understand how
different types of outlets approach Supreme Court coverage. For instance, Johnston and
Bartels (2010) argue that “sensationalistic” outlets, defined as cable news and talk radio
formats, offer more negative portrayals of the Court, perhaps portraying the Court in a more
politicized manner, as opposed to an unbiased legal institution. Numerous studies have
shown a proliferation of ideological news outlets (see Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010), many of
which are rather commonly associated with “liberal” or “conservative” coverage. For
example, The Wall Street Journal is often considered a more conservative news publication
than most, but when compared to the content of other “conservative” news outlets like The
Washington Times, a need for differentiation becomes apparent. Thus, my final hypothesis
states:
H3: Decision disagreement among the most ideologically extreme news outlets will lead to greater
levels of politicized language than decision agreement among less ideological outlets.
2.3 Data and Methods
This paper utilizes a unique dataset of news articles covering all Supreme Court
decisions in the 2014 term. Though all articles were collected through online sources, the
sample includes 1,076 articles from 30 different print, broadcast and strictly digital
organizations.1 Improving on studies that focus on a limited number of outlets, usually

1

The full list of organizations included in the sample: ABC, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, Associated Press, The
Daily Beast, The Boston Globe, CBS, CNN, The Christian Science Monitor, The Chicago Sun Times, The Chicago Tribune,
The Daily Kos, Dallas Morning News, Fox News, Fox Business, The Huffington Post, The Los Angeles Times, MSNBC,
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exclusively in elite print media like the New York Times, this work provides a more
representative sample of media outlets in the 21st Century. These organizations were
selected for their diversity, representing different formats, ideological foundations,
geographic regions, ownership and circulation sizes. Any articles from the selected
organizations that focused extensively on a Court’s decision, within a three-day period of
that decision, were collected.2 The total number of articles used in the analyses is 1,076.
2.3.1 Measuring Politicization
The dependent variable is a percentage-based measure of politicized words and
phrases found in each article. I borrow from the work of Johnson and Socker (2012) in
focusing on terms that emphasize the “actions, factions and interactions” that represent
more politicized coverage of the institution. These words and phrases allude to coalitions
and ideological representations of the Court, inter-branch relationships with other
governmental actions, and other terms that tend to suggest the Court is a political, rather
than purely legalistic, actor. These include terms like “liberal coalition,” “median justice,”
“President Obama,” and “Republican Party.” To provide an example, one article on the
term’s execution drug case, Glossip v. Gross, noted Justice Sotomayor “joined the other three
members of the Court’s liberal wing.” Another article on an Alabama redistricting case stated,
“Kennedy, often a swing vote, joined the Court’s four liberals in the majority.” In these articles,
the organizations opt to paint justices as ideological actors, often forming systematic
coalitions. The Obama administration was also a frequently mentioned political actor,

NBC, Newsmax, National Public Radio, The New York Post, The New York Times, Politico, Reuters, Salon,
SCOTUSblog, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and The Washington Times.
2
This three-day window allows enough time for an organization to decide whether a case decision will be
covered while greatly limiting the number of stories that focus nearly entirely on the opinions of outside actors.
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appearing in 120 articles alone, both in relation to the administration’s policies and the
president’s opinions on several decisions. This suggests outlets often attempt to pit the
Court against, or at least equate it to, the other political branches. Because the 2014 term fell
within the beginning stages of the presidential election cycle, each Republican and
Democratic candidate was also included. The decision to cover a candidate’s opinion of a
Court decision again politicizes the institution, as most instances of candidate inclusion
emphasize how they intend to alter the ideological makeup of the Court should they win the
presidential election.
After constructing a dictionary of politicized terms, using the selections of Johnson
and Socker (2012) in addition to the specific non-Court actors now included, the news
articles are then parsed using text analysis software, resulting in total counts for the applied
dictionary.3 These count totals are then divided by the total words in each article, establishing
a percentage of politicized language for each observation. These percentages represent the
conceptualization of media portrayal of the Supreme Court, addressing variance in politicized
language regarding the Court. The mean percentage of politicized words in an article is 9.08%
with a standard deviation of .11. Figure 2.1 provides the distribution of the constructed
dependent variable, revealing a heavy skew to the left with many zeroes. The dependent
variable violates OLS assumptions, and thus the subsequent analysis relies on a generalized
linear model with a gamma log link to better account for the distribution and avoid biased
estimates.

I use the R package “Weka,” a collection of data mining machine learning algorithms, to create these
dictionaries and apply them to the sample of news articles. The new variables are built on 60 applied terms
denoting emphasis on intra-Court interactions, ideology and inter-branch assessments. These terms can be
found in Appendix 1.
3
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2.3.2 Independent Variables
To test my hypotheses, I incorporate a number of key predictor variables in the
analysis. Dissensus is reconstructed into a three-value categorical variable representing the
change from complete consensus (0) to division (1) to complete dissensus (2). As a factor
variable, it operates as two dummy variables with an omitted category. Those cases with
minority sizes of one to three, between that of unanimity and dissensus, are included
together in the division category. Theoretically, I believe that total consensus will receive the
least amount of politicized coverage, and while those divisive decisions will receive more
than those of unanimity, the cases determined by 5-4 votes will be the most politicized.
Consensus (0) serves as the baseline in the analysis.
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To construct a measure of Decision Disagreement, I first use mondotimes.com user
ratings to assign an ideological news bias score to each organization (Ho and Quinn 2008).
Mondo provides information on 16,920 news organizations, with 60,000 users contributing
ratings for news bias. These ratings are used as a categorical variable coded as such: 0
(liberal); 1 (leans liberal); 2 (neutral) 3 (leans conservative) to 4 (conservative), with those
outlets rated as “no bias” serving as the reference category in the model. From Harold
Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Database (SCDB), liberal decision is a dichotomous variable of
liberal (1) vs. conservative (0) case decisions, with those observations listed as indeterminable
(n=7) dropped from the analysis.4 Decision disagreement is thus a dichotomous variable coded 1
if a liberal (conservative) media outlet is covering a conservative (liberal) decision from the
Court (coded 0 otherwise). Nearly 30% of the stories in the analysis involve an outlet
covering a decision with which it disagrees ideologically.
I also include a number of relevant control variables from the SCDB, taking omitted
variable bias into account. Issue area is broken into 14 categories: civil rights; First
Amendment; due process; privacy; attorneys; unions; economic activity; judicial power;
federalism; interstate relations; federal taxation; private action; miscellaneous; and private
action, with criminal procedure serving as the baseline category. As numerous studies have
suggested, an inherent media fascination with particular issue areas--especially those in the
“cultural” sphere” like notable civil rights and liberties cases (Spill and Oxley 2003; Spill
Solberg and Waltenburg 2014), I expect to see these issue areas covered with more
politicized language. Precedent alteration is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the

4

All excluded observations were stories on the sole case of original jurisdiction in the term, Kansas v.
Nebraska and Colorado (2015).
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Court broke from established precedent in the decision. I expect that those decisions that
fall against established precedent are more likely to elicit politically charged language from
the media. Winning party measures whether the case petitioner or respondent wins,
controlling for the Court’s decision to grant cert for the political opportunity to reverse a
lower court. U.S. Party simply classifies whether the U.S. Government was involved in the
case, which should control for any articles in which “Obama” is merely included as an
administrative actor. Finally, unconstitutionality is a categorical variable that indicates whether
the Court found a federal, state or local law unconstitutional. About 80% of the articles
cover decisions in which no type of law was found unconstitutional, the reference category.
2.4 Results
Table 2.1 reports the results of the GLM regressions testing hypotheses 1 and 2. The
full model, which includes both lack of consensus and dissensus, provides promising
preliminary support for my expectations. Figure 2 illustrates the coefficient plots for the
substantive variables included in the full GLM model, column 3. Compared to the baseline
of total consensus, both division on the Court and total dissensus among the justices result
in significantly higher estimates of politicized language. Figure 3 includes plotted predicted
values for both Court consensus levels and decision disagreement, with all other predictors
at their means. As illustrated, those cases that achieve total dissensus, a minority of four,
received substantially more politicized coverage than both consensus and mere division.
Additionally, I find support that decision disagreement is strongly connected to higher levels
of politicized language in coverage of the Supreme Court, even when controlling for news
bias and liberalism of decisions, though the substantive impact is somewhat modest. News
bias yields no significant results, though the liberalism of a decision is significant in all
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models. Precedent alteration is also significant in the right direction, suggesting a signal for
great politicization of the Court when it goes against what is in essence the paradigm of
common law.
These results suggest, at the very least, that news outlets are more inclined to discuss
ideological factions and the considerations of outside actors as consensus dissolves on the
Court. As expected, however, this is not a linear relationship. Most impactful to the
politicization of the Court appears to be a total dissensus among its members, in which
media outlets can observe obvious conflict among the justices, whether it be ideological or
not (both categories, when compared to consensus, are significant at p<.01). Additionally,
and despite a number of relevant, strict controls, a strong relationship is observed between
decision disagreement and politicization (p<.05). Again, this suggests that outlets whose
ideological foundations do not line up with individual decisions of the Court, (nearly all of
which can be categorized as liberal or conservative), will punish the Court through a more
politicized treatment of the decision. This can include highlighting the ideological factions
and partisan backgrounds of the justices, increased attention on those not in the majority
coalition to provide the opposing rationale, and the opinions of outside actors, including
members of the president, Congress, interest groups and presidential candidates.
Table 2:1 Predicting Politicized Language in Supreme Court Coverage (Continued on next
page)
Model 1
Divided Court

0.54***
(0.13)
1.52***
(0.12)

Dissensus Court
Decision Disagreement
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(2)

Model 3

0.14
(0.09)

0.59***
(0.13)
1.57***
(0.12)
0.25**
(0.10)

Leans Liberal
Leans Conservative
Conservative News
Liberal Decision
Control Variables
Federal Unconstitutional
State Unconstitutional
Local Unconstitutional
U.S. Party
Alters Precedent
Petitioner Wins
Civil Rights
First Amendment
Due Process
Attorneys
Unions
Economics
Judicial Power
Federalism
Federal Taxation
Miscellaneous
Constant
BIC
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0.06
(0.08)
0.13
(0.18)
0.14
(0.11)
0.28**
(0.11)

-0.01
(0.09)
0.04
(0.18)
0.07
(0.13)
0.31**
(0.10)

-0.02
(0.09)
0.04
(0.18)
-0.05
(0.13)
0.37***
(0.12)

-1.59***
(0.49)
-0.82***
(0.22)
-0.39
(0.34)
0.14
(0.10)
1.40***
(0.36)
-0.37***
(0.10)
0.06
(0.14)
0.48***
(0.16)
0.09
(0.26)
-1.90***
(0.3)
0.80***
(0.28)
0.37***
(0.12)
-0.07
(0.20)
0.23
(0.44)
1.56***
(0.18)
3.14***
(0.53)
-4.05***
(0.15)

2.16**
(0.48)
-0.23
(0.22)
-0.82**
(0.33)
0.31**
(0.11)
2.58**
(0.34)
-0.60**
(0.10)
0.61**
(0.13)
0.44**
(0.15)
0.66**
(0.25)
2.68**
(0.36)
-0.11
(0.27)
0.20*
(0.11)
-0.12
(0.20)
-0.61
(0.42)
1.18**
(0.17)
3.33**
(0.52)
2.68**
(0.12)

-1.58***
(0.48)
-0.80***
(0.22)
-0.32
(0.33)
0.14
(0.10)
1.35***
(0.36)
-0.36***
(0.10)
0.07
(0.13)
0.50***
(0.16)
0.13
(0.26)
-1.79***
(0.37)
0.77***
(0.28)
0.38***
(0.11)
-0.07
(0.20)
0.26
(0.43)
1.57***
(0.18)
3.14***
(0.52)
-4.16***
(0.16)

-6804.74

6820.5

-6798.60

(Table 2.1 Continued)
N
1,076
1,076
1,076
Note: Entries are GLM coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Two-tailed). The BIC (Bayseian Information Criterion) is a
model of fit that penalizes for excessive parameters. A lower BIC indicates a better fit.
With moderate support for my first two hypotheses established, I turn to the final
hypothesis: Does the ideological extremism of an outlet impact its coverage of disagreeable
decisions? The previous models show no support for conservative or liberal media bias, at
any level, which should not be surprising; there is little reason to believe outlets uniformly
treat the Court as a liberal or conservative. Rather, ideological outlets should look at cases
individually and punish or reward the Court in their portrayals based on decision agreement.
This expectation is supported thus far, but it does not address the fact that some outlets are
more ideologically aligned than others. Specifically, are those outlets that are most liberal and
conservative more likely to lash out at disagreeable decisions with more politicized
portrayals?
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Figure 2.2 Plotted Coefficients of Politicized Language
Divided Court
Dissensus Court
Decision Disagreement
Liberal News
Leans Left
Leans Right
Conservative News
Liberal Decision
Federal Unconstitutional
State Unconstitutional
Local Unconstitutional
U.S. Party
Alters Precedent
Petitioner Wins
Civil Rights
First Amendment
Due Process
Attorneys
Unions
Economic Activity
Judicial Power
Federalism
Federal Taxation
Miscellaneous
-4

-2

0
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Coefficients from Table 1 Model 3

Returning to the news bias variable, based on mondotimes.com user scores of outlet
ideology, I include a series of interaction terms in the model formed by multiplying Decision
Direction times the four News Bias dummies (i.e., Leans Left, Neutral, Leans Right and
Conservative, with Liberal the omitted category). Table 2.2 presents the results of other
variables of interest. Once again, the importance of dissensus remains intact, as expected.
The interactions between the categorical news bias variable and the dichotomous decision
direction are small and insignificant, with one key exception. As indicated in the model, the
interaction between conservative outlets decision direction, [name of interaction term], is
highly significant, indicating that conservative outlets use much more politicized language
when reporting on liberal decisions than they do for conservative decisions. The coefficient,
.82, indicates that the gap in the use of politicized language between liberal versus
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conservative decisions among conservative outlets is fairly substantial, more than three
times larger than the average Decision Direction coefficient (.25) reported in Table 1
(column 3, full model).
Table 2.2: Predicting Politicized Coverage from News Bias and Decision Disagreement
Con News x Lib Decision

0.82***
(0.23)
0.04
(0.25)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.05
(0.18)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.34
(0.36)
0.00 (
0.00)
0.57***
(0.13)
1.57***
(0.12)
-4.02***
(0.18)
-6779.05
1,076

Lib News x Lib Decision
Leans Left x Con Decision
Leans Left x Lib Decision
Neutral x Con Decision
Neutral x Lib Decision
Leans Right x Con Decision
Leans Right x Lib Decision
Con News x Con Decision
Divided Court
Dissensus Court
Constant
BIC
N

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Entries are GLM coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
News bias, liberal decision, U.S. Party, Alters Precedent, Law Unconstitutional and Issue
Area omitted for space.
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To illustrate just how large the difference is for conservative outlets compared to
others, the predicted values of percent politicized language for liberal versus and
conservative decisions are arrayed across the news bias of the outlet in Figure 2.3

0

Predicted Mean Politicized Words
.05
.1
.15

Figure 2.3: News Bias and Decision Disagreement

Liberal

Leans Left

Neutral

Leans Right

Conservative

News Bias
Conservative Decision

Liberal Decision

Note: The Y-Axis is the predicted average percentage of politicized words in the news
report. The X-axis is News Bias, the political bias of the news organization. . Error bars
included at the 95% confidence level.
The figure clearly shows that the difference between politicized coverage for liberal
and conservative decisions is tiny for Liberal, leans Left, Neutral and Leans Right outlets,
Conservative outlets portray liberal and conservative Court decisions very differently. The
percentage of politicized language for conservative decisions is only 5%, far below the
average politicization for the other four types of outlets. When Conservative outlets cover
liberal decisions, however, the percentage of politicized language is considerably higher.
Clearly, the tendency for Conservative outlets to seemingly disparage liberal decisions with
politicized language and sanitize conservative decisions by comparison is exceptional. With
an average word count of 499 words per story, these differences are not trivial. Instead, it
suggests that a news consumer’s ideological bias, and the decision to consume Supreme
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Court coverage from the most ideologically conservative organizations (e.g., Fox News), are
likely lead to far greater exposure to politicized coverage of liberal decisions.
2.5 Discussion
This paper contributes several important findings regarding the Supreme Court’s link
to the mass media. First, the evidence supports the theory that conflict-driven media use
more politicized language when reporting on decisions of greater dissensus. Almost
uniformly, I find that as consensus dissolves, the amount of politicized language used to
describe the Court’s decisions rises. It appears Chief Justice Warren may have been correct
in his assessment that unanimous decisions send stronger cues to the public, particularly in
those cases of great controversy. I find that when the Court’s unanimity crumbles, the media
turns its attention from the decision itself to intra-branch conflict and inter-branch
reflections.
Second, I find that decision disagreement can play a significant impact in the
portrayal of the Court’s decisions. Despite the judiciary’s relative insulation from much of
the political squabbling that plagues Washington, it is, by any definition a political institution
handing down many ideological decisions. And while the Court is not easily assigned a label
as liberal or conservative institution at any point in time, as evinced by the work of Bartels
and Johnston (2012), individual decisions can be relatively easier to decipher as ideologically
driven. Counter these ideological decisions with ideological news outlets, and you have an
opportunity for politicization through disagreement with Court actions.
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Studies of partisan news have produced mixed results over time. The understanding
of how partisan news addresses the Court specifically, as opposed to say the presidency, is
less well developed. Specifically, I argue that it is not merely the news organization’s own
ideological biases, nor the simple direction of the decision that leads to increased
politicization, but rather a combination of the two that may lead to greater politicization in
decision coverage. In particular, the most conservative organizations are found to portray
the Supreme Court in a more politicized light when the Court hands down decisions
considered to be ideologically liberal, while downplaying that type of language when in
agreement with the Court’s decision. Thus, individuals receiving their information about the
Court from outlets like Fox News or The Washington Times are consuming a fairly
ideologically driven portrayal of the Court, regardless of decision direction. This finding
suggests that the most ideologically conservative outlets feel unabashed in their commitment
to providing a partisan treatment of political institutions, rewarding the Court for agreeable
decisions and punishing it when in disagreement with case outcomes. That this finding is
also largely restricted to conservative outlets is also telling; the number of accessible neutral
and liberal organizations is far greater than those with conservative allegiances, yet
conservative outlets maintain loyal consumers and often trounce their ideological
counterparts in circulation or viewership. The conservative outlet Fox News, for instance, is
almost unchallenged in cable news viewership, often accumulating more total viewers in a
year than its leading competitors, CNN and MSNBC, combined (Kissel 2015). Thus, while
many consumers may be exposed to supportive portrayals of the Court under ideological
agreeable circumstances, the alternative scenarios are inevitable.
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While more work needs to be done to understand how language impacts media
consumers, this chapter lays the groundwork for a more thorough examination of disparity
in Supreme Court coverage specifically. Though analyzing only one Supreme Court term, I
examine a far more inclusive and representative sample of a more current media
environment. Furthermore, the year’s decisions are by no means abnormal, with a mere
handful of cases receiving heightened attention due to the controversies involved in their
outcomes. Collecting articles from a varied sample of media outlets is an arduous task, but it
is far more telling, and relevant, than the tradition of focusing on a small group of
ideologically similar print organizations (e.g. The New York Times, The Washington Post and The
Los Angeles Times.) It is clear that ideological news bias does contribute to differences in
Supreme Court coverage, beyond the blanket condemnation of a “conservative” or “liberal”
Court. Instead, the individual decisions of the Court offer a variety of potential prisms
through which outlets can portray the Court.
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CHAPTER 3: Media Coverage of the Supreme Court Nomination Process: The Kavanaugh
Nomination
Over the last three decades, the nomination and confirmation process for Supreme
Court nominees has undoubtedly intensified in nature. While the process has never been
entirely without conflict, partisan polarization and the insistence from presidents on more
ideological nominees (Baum 2017) has led the nomination process into a remarkably
contentious period in history. Where Court observers once lamented that the confirmation
process produced “nothing of value” (Lemieux 2010), with nominees potentially using the
hearing itself to dodge questions and posture as non-ideological umpires, the current
political atmosphere makes such perceptions hard to stand by. In other words, in recent
nominations the confirmation process has been used as a highly politicized tool by
lawmakers to investigate not only the legal background of the nominees, but their personal
lives as well. The likelihood of unanimity in Senate voting for any nominee is all but zero
(Denison and Wedeking 2018), as partisanship and greater focus on the personal lives of the
nominees have created a situation in which Senators are seemingly no longer voting on the
merits of the nominee, but whether or not lawmakers’ party is in accordance with the
president and their selection.
Arguably, a great deal of this change can be attributed to the attention now given to
nominations and confirmation hearings, a fairly recent trend but nevertheless a very
important development in the nomination process. As Farganis and Wedeking (2014) argue,
due to the relatively rare occasion of a Supreme Court vacancy and nomination, the
introduction of widely televised hearings beginning with O’Connor in 1981 allow legislators
a unique opportunity to leverage broader public interest into an example of their dedicated
and thorough public service. This is one of the most blatant representations of the
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separation of shared powers involving all three branches of government, thus pulling the
Supreme Court into the politicized world of Washington from which it so often shies away.
Though nominees have been asked to submit to some type of hearing over the last
century, becoming a regular fixture for nominations in the 1950s, the attention now paid to
nominees is at an historical apex. And again, while presidents have floated controversial
nominees over the years, including those who failed to pass muster in the Senate, either by
formal vote (e.g., Bork), recommendation for withdrawal (e.g. Miers), or through partisan
blockade of the nomination (e.g. Garland), nominees now face blistering criticism not only
from the Senators who task them with answering for their records, but also by an
increasingly attentive news media whose own reporting spurs on much of the controversy
that plays out in the Senate. Recent confirmation hearings of eventual justices Clarence
Thomas in 1991, Neil Gorsuch in 2017 and Brett Kavanaugh in 2018 all resulted in not only
controversy within the Senate chambers, but immense public involvement in the
nominations, spurred on by coverage of the hearings (e.g., Caldeira and Smith 1996). Thus,
while it is now possible to actually view the confirmation hearings in their entirety on
television, or even find transcripts of the proceedings, a great many interested Americans will
still look to the news media to interpret the events of the day, as well as the qualifications
and controversies of the nominee in the days leading up to their hearings.
Two of the most recent nominees, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, both nominated by
President Donald Trump, were undoubtedly mired in partisan bickering before ever setting
foot inside the Senate chambers. Following the death of Justice Antonin Scalia,
conservatives, rightfully, lamented the idea of the Obama Administration replacing the
conservative icon with a liberal selection, therefore potentially swaying the ideological center
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of the Court. Meanwhile, liberals salivated at the chance to fill the seat as Obama remained
in office, hoping to pick off the aging conservatives one by one as power shifted to what was
a presumed Clinton administration. Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland was halted by
Senate Republicans entirely, and the expectation of a Clinton presidency faltered in the
surprising election of Republican Donald Trump. President Trump subsequently nominated
judge Neil Gorsuch of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. Though widely
respected as a judge, as was Garland, the circumstances under which Gorsuch is nominated
are somewhat unprecedented. In a largely partisan act of defiance, Republican Senators
successfully thwarted an adversarial challenge by Democrats, despite heavy criticism by leftleaning media outlets.
The nomination of Brett Kavanaugh, as will be discussed at greater length
throughout this chapter, came under vastly different circumstances, but drew an even greater
divide in media coverage. With the retirement of consistent “swing-voter” Anthony
Kennedy, President Trump nominated D.C. Circuit judge Brett Kavanaugh for the position.
Throughout the cycle of his nomination, accusations of impropriety in his youth, including
the possibility of sexual assault in high school and later in college, began to unfold.
Reminiscent of Anita Hill’s testimony in the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, which
resulted in a narrow 52-48 vote in Thomas’ favor, Dr. Christine Blasey Ford testified before
the Senate Judiciary Committee claiming that Kavanaugh had sexually assaulted her at a
party in high school. Coupled with accusations by Democrats of Kavanaugh’s potential
problems with alcohol, the media kept a laser-sharp focus on the nomination of the eventual
Associate Justice.
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Republicans and conservatives saw another opportunity to place a like-minded
individual on the Court. Democrats and liberals, many still reeling from a presidential
contest loss and the dismissal of an Obama nomination in the prior term, saw this as an
opportunity for conservatives to chip away at liberal legal precedent. This type of issue
coverage is not uncommon in recent years regarding Supreme Court nominations, as the
nomination process is one of the most visible components of all Supreme Court activities
(Spill Solberg and Waltenburg 2015). However, this typical partisan back-and-forth would
soon take a backseat to an investigation into the personal life of Brett Kavanaugh and a
series of sexual assault allegations that would potentially put his confirmation in jeopardy.
In the midst of the #MeToo social movement regarding sexual assaults and
harassment of women, particularly by powerful men in a work environment, the Kavanaugh
accusations were a bombshell in the middle of what would have been a fairly typical,
partisan-driven nomination (Gilmore 2019; AbiNader, Thomas and Carolan 2020). As this
chapter discusses, if given the opportunity, the focus of not only the media, but political
elites, may shift away from traditional issues areas like legal philosophy or policy stances and
toward the more personal elements of a nominee’s profile (Spill Solberg and Waltenburg
2015).
In this regard, the Kavanaugh nomination is perhaps most similar to that of the
Thomas nomination. While both were generally considered well-qualified nominees, as
sexual allegations arose, the narrative largely shifts away from one of judicial ideology toward
a far broader discussion of the credibility of those accusations, largely through the lens of
ideology. That is to say, where conservatives would likely have approved of Kavanaugh’s
nomination in light of his ideological record on the bench, following the reveal of sexual
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assault allegations from the nominee’s youth, the ideological focus shifts toward an
assessment of the credibility of the accuser against that of the accused. While more
Americans overall believed Blasey Ford’s account than Kavanugh’s (Montanaro 2018), this
meant little for partisan beliefs regarding confirmation. According to a poll conducted in
October of 2018, 46% of American adults surveyed believed Blasey Ford’s account in
contrast to 33%. Nevertheless, when split by partisanship, 76% of Democrats believed
Blasey Ford and 76% of Republicans sided with Kavanaugh’s account.
What is interesting for the purposes of this study is whether media choice may have
something to do with this split and the more general understanding of support for the
nominee. It is one thing to simply side with a nominee aligned with your own partisan or
ideological preferences, as perhaps a Republican or conservative would in this individual
case. However, recent scholarship suggests that the contentiousness of the nomination and
its confirmation hearings may have struck a blow to the institution’s legitimacy. Krewson
and Schroedel (2020) show evidence that Kavanaugh’s nomination resulted in lower levels of
diffuse support generally, though partisan factors still come into play. With this in mind, I
suggest the tone of coverage one is exposed to regarding this nomination could strengthen
or weaken that level of support. It is this, the tone of coverage across the media landscape,
that drives the purpose of this chapter, as we attempt to better understand how outlets
presented the nomination of Kavanaugh and how those outlets differ in the tone of their
coverage, both within key phases of the nomination as well as when the nomination moved
from one key phase to the next, including the tie period in which Kavanaugh battled
allegations against his personal character.
This chapter focuses on the media’s treatment of the Kavanaugh nomination, tracing
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the tone of coverage from the announcement of his candidacy through his eventual
confirmation vote on October 6, 2018 of 50-48. While Kavanaugh is not the most recent
nominee to the Supreme Court, with the success of the Amy Coney Barrett nomination in
2020, his nomination does provide a unique opportunity in coverage observations.
Considering Kavanaugh’s nomination began in a largely conventional fashion, with the usual
partisan considerations at the onset, with accusations coming out in the middle of the
confirmation process, we can see how this effectively changed coverage tone among
ideological outlets.
I seek to answer the question of whether there are systematic shifts in the tone of
media coverage. Using a large dataset of news articles from outlets that span the ideological
spectrum, I will provide one of the first systematic analyses of Supreme Court nomination
coverage, honing in on how partisan media differs in coverage of candidates regarding the
negativity in language, the politicization of tone, as well as the subject matter of focus.
Focusing on such a highly contentious nomination that was torn by both emotional
reactions to the accusations and political polarization, this chapter provides a unique look at
the media’s ability to shape narratives and potentially impact consumers’ perceptions of a
nominee, the Senate’s advise and consent function, as well as the legitimacy of the institution
in which the nominee would eventually find appointment.
3.1 Supreme Court Nominations and Media Coverage
Scholarship on the media’s coverage of Supreme Court nominations is notably
sparse, but to a certain extent, for good reason. They are not a common event, nor are they
timed in the same fashion as an election cycle. Thus, while the past four presidents have all
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had two Supreme Court appointees a piece, there is no guarantee as to when, or even if,
these vacancies will occur. For example, Jimmy Carter never had a Supreme Court vacancy.
Nevertheless, the nomination and subsequent confirmation process is one of the rare
occasions in which all three branches of the federal government are involved. The president,
with the advice of the Senate, nominates the judicial candidate, and their success or failure
will leave some mark on the presidency as an indicator of general success. Congress, and
more specifically the Senate, carries out the “advise and consent” function, in which the
Senate Judiciary Committee vets the candidate in a public forum and, should the candidate
make it through this challenge, the Senate will vote at large as to her ability to serve. Finally,
and most obviously, should the candidate make it through the Senate, they will serve
alongside eight other justices of the Supreme Court until their retirement or death, without
serious threat of removal. It is also perhaps the most transparent aspect of the Supreme
Court, as the institution has consistently avoided the scrutiny of the public eye.
Alternatively, Supreme Court confirmation hearings have been televised to some
degree since Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s nomination in 1981, expanding ever since to
include daily coverage from 24-hour news organizations and even network television
(Farganis and Wedeking 2014). With this highly covered event comes the inevitable result of
increased political mixing, as potential justices are required to operate under the rules of the
Senate and participate in a traditionally politicized discussion of their ambitions, morals,
ethics and past deliberations.
As Collins and Ringhand (2013) detail, the nomination of a potential Supreme Court
justice involves a great many obstacles for the appointing president. The president consults a
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number of advisors, including the attorney general and various legal groups like the
Federalist Society, and must find a candidate that will be approved by the Senate in their
advice and consent function. What often goes overlooked in this process is the media’s role
in portraying the nominee, not only highlighting the importance of the vacancy itself, but
giving news consumers an opportunity to vet the candidate themselves and voice their
concerns with their senators. As Krutz, Fleisher and Bond (1998) note, the media plays a
tremendous role in the dissemination of information about nominees that can lead to their
successful appointment, or more importantly, their subsequent failure. Therefore, a greater
understanding of the media environment surrounding judicial nominations is critical to
understanding the political consequences of nominations and how they can be manipulated
in media formats.
The news media provide what Slotnick and Segal (1998) describe as a “critical link”
between the Supreme Court and the general public, one of particular importance considering
the accessibility challenges associated with the institution. Since members of the Court rarely
engage with the press to justify their decisions, and because much Supreme Court activity is
littered with legalese that may be both confusing and deterring to the general public, it is a
logical expectation that the press act as a translator. This is not necessarily any different in a
typical confirmation hearing, or when going through the past judicial decisions of a nominee.
Americans rely on the news media to provide relevant information that can be used to
evaluate political decisions and decision makers. This makes journalist Max Friedman’s
assertion that the Supreme Court is the “worst reported and worst judged institution in the
American system of government” a rather troubling conclusion (Quoted in Grey 1968, 5).
Coupled with a great deal of empirical evidence that suggests a very similar assessment (e.g.
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Ericson 1977; Slotnick and Segal 1998), it appears many Americans are receiving little
information about the Court when compared to other institutions, and an arguably distorted
representation of the Court and its work. Thus, the nomination of justices, whose
confirmation is held in public view (aside from their one-on-one meetings with senators that
are now common place), provides one of the rare chances for the American public to make
their own assessments about the nature of the office and the individuals who hold these
positions.
Much of the justification for poor quality of coverage is a combination of inadequate
resources for critical reporting (Grey 1968; Davis 1994) and journalistic preferences for
simple, sensational, visual and “personality-centric” stories the Court is often unwilling or
unable to provide (Davis 1994; Davis 2011; Grey 1968; Newland 1964; Spill Solberg and
Waltenburg 2015; Vining and Marcin 2014). Indeed, as Spill Solberg and Waltenburg (2015)
note, the confirmation process is one that most directly relates to the “cult of personality,”
leading many reporters toward a discussion of the candidate’s personality traits rather than
some of their more compelling judicial opinions.5 Most outlets have little interest in Supreme
Court beat reporters, and many covering the Court may not have any legal education or
specialty in legal reporting (though many do) (Davis 1994). Because the Court’s deliberations
are almost entirely behind closed doors, and the Court maintains a policy banning cameras in
the courtroom, the opportunity for visual and conflict-centric reporting is severely limited,
particularly when compared to the argumentative and relatively open practices of Congress.
Additionally, the justices do not tend to seek out media sources to promote or justify their

With the exception of Elena Kagan, who served as Solicitor General under the Obama Administration before
her appointment to the Supreme Court, all other sitting justices have prior judicial experience.
5
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decisions as members of Congress do, instead allowing their opinions to essentially speak for
themselves. These issues can make Court reporting an unattractive task, particularly in a
predominantly visual medium like television (Slotnick and Segal 1998), and the additional
burden of deciphering what can be complicated and complex legal language may deter many
journalists from pitching Court stories at all. In an era of “sound-byte” journalism, the
justices do not often provide the sexiest options on any given news day, which may preserve
some of its goodwill but inarguably hinders public knowledge.
Early studies of coverage quality often focused on assessments of what information
journalists chose to provide. For instance, Newland’s (1964) investigation into newspaper
coverage of two decisions reveals that the media’s focus is often lacking in decision analysis,
but heavily dedicated to reactions, while Grey (1968) notes that analysis of the Court’s
decisions is far less attentive than treatment of other institutions. Ericson’s (1977) study of
three newspapers’ coverage of the Court reveals a general lack of adequate coverage based
on a rubric of basic details one may expect in a thorough discussion of the Court’s decision
(see also Solomine 1980).
Television, the medium through which most Americans receive their news, provides
its own series of dilemmas. Most television outlets fail to employ Supreme Court, or even
legal, specialists of any kind. The decision to not maintain specialists for Court reporting is
associated with more incidents of inaccuracy (Newland 1964; Slotnick and Segal 1998), and
television reporting in particular has a tendency to oversimplify and mischaracterize Court
actions, notably at the certiorari stage (Slotnick and Segal 1998). However, unique to
Supreme Court coverage, the widely-accepted decision to televise confirmation hearings in
full does give Americans an opportunity to witness their testimony for themselves, as well as
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the grandstanding of senators attempting to highlight their own work (Farganis and
Wedeking 2014).
Importantly, Larson’s (1985) study of newspaper coverage shows the media is quite
attentive to several issue areas, like racial discrimination, that may be considered more
“newsworthy,” but emphasizes this means the media’s lack of coverage is largely a choice,
and not necessarily dictated by editorial constraints. Other issue areas identified as press
favorites include First Amendment and criminal procedure cases (Collins and Cooper 2012;
Davis 2014; Slotnick and Segal 1998; Spill Solberg and Waltenburg 2015).
The idea of “newsworthiness” has been examined in several ways, with some noting
that journalists may be able to identify cases that have broad public interest (Slotnick and
Segal 1998), but are often not considered salient issues by those in the legal community (Spill
Solberg and Waltenburg 2015). This agenda setting function of the press may provide a
distorted portrayal of the Court whose workload is not dominated by cases in the
aforementioned issue areas. Additionally, the decision to often focus disproportionately on
the individual justices, the “cult of personality,” confirms general journalistic preferences for
easy, sensational coverage that may attract a larger audience but lacks substantive analysis
(Spill Solberg and Waltenburg 2015). As opposed to dissecting a Court opinion, it is easier to
discuss trivialities. All of this evidence suggests that the news media is often neglectful
toward the Supreme Court, either through coverage that is facile, inaccurate and inarticulate,
or through a refusal to cover the institution at all. The coverage of the nomination and
confirmation hearings of a candidate obviously offers a different avenue for journalistic
expression. Though the press has the opportunity to focus on whatever aspects of the
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nomination they like, the questions and content produced by the Senate will undoubtedly
dominate some coverage.
The studies discussed up to this point largely focus on coverage quality as a function
of adequacy; is coverage complete, thorough and accurate? This is, of course, an important
aspect of understanding public knowledge of the Court and its activities. While many have
noted knowledge of the Court is low compared to many other aspects of political knowledge
(Caldeira 1986, but see Gibson and Caldeira 2009c), based on the aforementioned evidence,
we should not be surprised. Americans are consistently presented with poor quality
coverage, at least in relation to adequacy.
In addition to simply analyzing what the media covers regarding the Court, (and
whether they get it right), we should also consider how the media covers the Court. The
media can essentially choose what to focus on and how to frame the Court and its actions in
any way they like, though as previously mentioned, many will attempt to provide content in a
way that will attract consumers. Thus, in assuming that consumers prefer stories about, for
instance, judicial personalities or controversial issues (Spill Solberg and Waltenburg 2015),
not only are many outlets providing inarticulate coverage, but also framing discussions of
Court activities that may impact public opinion of the institution. Some have argued that the
Supreme Court’s comparatively high public approval ratings are a byproduct of positive
symbolism pushed by the media (Gibson and Caldeira 2009b; Gibson, Lodge and Woodson
2014; Spill and Oxley 2003). A media environment that uniformly promotes a “myth of
legality” is not necessarily a “quality” one in a strict sense of accuracy, but legalistic
portrayals of the Court are decidedly different in quality than other potential frames. As
numerous studies have convincingly shown, extralegal elements often have significant
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impacts on judicial decision making, and thus, media framing that promotes positivity is not
an entirely “accurate” depiction, but it is one avenue for presentation. A fairly recent body of
research has not only attempted to see if the media does indeed push this “myth of legality,”
but also under what circumstances this tone shifts and biases in coverage reveal themselves.
These studies provide new considerations of what constitutes “quality” coverage and how it
can affect public perceptions.
While some have shown evidence that the media does indeed promote a fairly
legalistic portrayal of the Court (Spill and Oxley 2003; Spill Solberg and Waltenburg 2015),
these tend to rely on relatively small outlet samples that plague many media studies (Collins
and Cooper 2012; Epstein and Segal 2000). Furthermore, an emphasis on legalistic portrayals
may be good for institutional legitimacy, but it may not be an accurate representation of the
Court and its work. Additional scholarship has shown that legalistic language does not imply
a dearth of politicized language, and things like the alteration of precedent and the majority
coalition size can affect the use of legalistic language (Johnson and Socker 2012). Therefore,
discrepancies in tonal quality may be the result of implicit biases and heuristic shortcuts in
the journalistic community (Zilis, Wedeking, and Denison 2017). Again, regarding the
nomination of a potential justice, the media has the opportunity to focus on past legal work,
but may opt toward something more personality-driven (Fogarty, Qadri and Wohlfarth 2020;
Spill Solberg and Waltenburg 2015), as seen in the Thomas hearing with Anita Hill or the
Kavanaugh nomination’s focus on potential alcohol issues and alleged sexual misconduct.
Why does quality matter in coverage of the Supreme Court? The Supreme Court,
unlike most other political institutions in the U.S., has a keen interest in its own public
approval. Because its central judicial authority is not expressly dictated in the Constitution,
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and because constraints on the Court necessitate that other actors comply with and
implement their decisions to be effective, the Court’s legitimacy is of comparatively greater
concern (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Hoekstra 2000).
Research on the Court’s legitimacy has recently begun to acknowledge that the media, as the
link between the Court and the public, possesses considerable power in this relationship
(Bartels and Johnston 2012; Johnston and Bartels 2010). With emphasis on tonal quality –
the framing of Court and the actions surrounding it – a number of experimental studies have
shown that negative or politicized portrayals of the Court and its decisions affect public
evaluations of the Court. Exposure to negative portrayals of the institution weakens support
for the Court’s decisions (Zilis 2015), and affects evaluations about the institution’s
procedural fairness (Baird and Gangl 2006; Ramirez 2008; though see Gibson and Caldeira
2011 for an alternative perspective). This line of research shows that negativity in coverage
can have significant consequences. It stands to reason that negative coverage in the
nomination process would follow a similar pattern.
Gibson and Caldeira’s (2009a) examination of the Alito confirmation in the context
of positivity theory suggests that those Americans’ with high levels of institutional loyalty to
the Supreme Court were far more likely to formulate their opinions on confirmation through
a lens of judiciousness, as opposed to more ideological considerations. Again, the authors’
theory stems from a larger literature on mass behavior recently pulled into political science,
motivated reasoning, best associated with Taber and Lodge (2013). As Gibson and Caldeira
(2009a) note, Bush’s nomination of Alito came at a time of considerable polarization, and
Alito’s record both before and since his time on the high court suggest he is a staunchly
conservative jurist. Despite this, Americans’ views of Alito did not appear to be nearly as
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polarized as opinions of congressional lawmakers, despite what was a fairly contentious
hearing that resulted in a 58-42 confirmation vote in favor of the nominee.6
While Gibson and Caldeira (2009c) focus their attention on the positive role of
institutional loyalty, it is equally important to consider the flipside of that coin. While high
institutional loyalty may result in greater weight toward judiciousness, lower institutional
loyalty means a greater reliance on ideological and partisan cues. Coupled with the litany of
research from Gibson and others arguing that “to know the Court is to the love the Court,”
it is reasonable to suggest that many being exposed to confirmation hearings are not avid
Court followers, and therefore must rely on ideological and partisan cues. Many of these cues
are most likely best emphasized through the media coverage of the hearings, focusing on
conflict between members of Congress and the nominee, as well as greater attention toward
ideology. Additionally, it is quite likely, as opposed to coverage of Supreme Court decisions,
much of this coverage is less prone to include positive symbolic judicial symbols, but rather
the nominee before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the nominee without robes, and greater
focus on the Senate and its members.
The recent politicized nominations and confirmations of Justice Neil Gorsuch and
Justice Brett Kavanaugh have only heightened the level of interest in the confirmation
process and potentially brought greater scrutiny among both lawmakers and the public in
regard to the nomination process. The initial nomination of a conservative jurist, federal
appellate judge Neil Gorsuch, was among the first items of business for the new
administration. Revealed in a highly theatrical primetime presentation that had both finalists
racing toward D.C. a la ‘Cannonball Run’ to claim their prize as nominee (Cillizza 2017), the

6

Senate Democrats attempted to filibuster Alito’s nomination, but cloture was invoked.
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nomination would inevitably be debated. Though widely respected as a judge, as was
Garland, the circumstances under which Gorsuch was nominated were somewhat
unprecedented. As part of the aftermath, the retirement of Anthony Kennedy would again
bring forth a nominee, Kavanaugh, mired in the conflict of the political environment that
postures the Trump Administration against its own case of Democratic foes.
This is not to suggest that the Gorsuch or Kavanaugh nominations are alone in
conflict-oriented coverage. As Davis (1994) points out, “It has become almost conventional
wisdom that Supreme Court nominees possess some character flaw that will emerge in the
confirmation process and seriously jeopardize, if not fatally damage, their chances of earning
confirmation. The players in the process only wait for it to emerge” (1062). Whether it be
attention paid toward sexual harassment allegations, substance abuse, or any array of
unflattering topics, nominees are not above the more sensationalized and tabloid-centric foci
of the news media. More directly related to the purposes of this discussion, the confirmation
process has become something of an ideological battleground, one in which the President’s
success in picking a nominee that will be confirmed is often discussed as more important
than the characteristics of the nominee themselves. And, since the confirmation hearings are
now a televised and fairly popular news event, the grandstanding of senators in opposition to
the nominee is a highlight of the news cycle (Farganis and Wedeking 2014). All of this is to
say that the media is a very important aspect of the nomination, providing details of the
nominee’s personal and professional characteristics, the context of their nomination and the
ideological conflict at hand.
Not unlike prior nominees like Robert Bork, the controversies surrounding recent
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nominations arguably have little to do with judicial qualifications, but rather the ideological
and philosophical traits that define each nominee. This is a matter of pure politics – and
quite impolite politics at that. Many liberals called for Democratic Senators to essentially
“return the favor” and filibuster Gorsuch at all costs, claiming the seat rightfully belonged to
Garland. President Trump encouraged Republicans to take the nuclear option should a
filibuster be attempted, an effective but myopic strategy, as much of the prior activity
surrounding the nuclear option has proved to be. While invoking the “nuclear option” of
dropping the Senate threshold for Supreme Court nominees from 60 votes to invoke cloture
to a simple majority certainly solved the immediate concerns over Gorsuch’s confirmation, it
also sets intriguing precedent for Democratic retaliation should they gain majority status
once more. In the end, Gorsuch was indeed confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 54-45,
even narrower than that of Alito over a decade earlier. Would such a politicized and
contentious debate over the confirmation of the nominee find its way into media outlets,
and particularly, into those with ideological or partisan objectives?
3.2 Understanding Differences in Nomination Coverage in the Modern Media Environment
The confirmation hearings for Brett Kavanaugh were covered with great fervor, and
due to the political climate, were likely be steeped in negative, politicized language among
liberal outlets, and perhaps more laudatory language from more conservative outlets. As
previously mentioned, recent research has shown that negative news coverage of institutions
has a strong impact on public assessments of the Court (Bartels and Johnston 2012;
Johnston and Bartels 2010; Zilis 2015), and there is some evidence that ideological media
bias seeps over into coverage of the judicial branch, as well (Denison 2017; Zilis, Wedeking
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and Denison 2020). There is additionally some work that investigates the general coverage
preferences of media outlets in the nomination process, suggesting a bias toward “culture
war” topics, emphasizing issues like abortion to a disproportionate extent when compared to
the Court’s attention to the issue (Evans and Pearson-Markowitz 2012). And as Farganis and
Wedeking (2014) argue, media coverage of the confirmation process has increased over time
with changes in media, and the spectacle has significantly impacted nominee and senatorial
behavior. Finally, it is expected that coverage became more politicized as the hearings, and
the eventual vote, approached. This nomination provides a prime example of how various
media outlets can provide disparate coverage of the same event, suggesting large swaths of
the population are receiving vastly different information, and consequently, arriving at
different judgments (Iyengar and Hahn 2009). This work would be the first to breech the
topic, and at a very opportune time.
The expectation of ideological bias is much greater for the nomination process than
that of decision making coverage, for a number of reasons. First, the nomination of a
Supreme Court appointee is an inherently political event that involves all three branches of
government, as opposed to just the work of the Supreme Court (Spill Solberg and
Waltenburg 2015). Second, the nomination, and in particular, the confirmation process, is a
far more accessible event than any singular Supreme Court decision, allowing for television
access, more diverse imagery, and a direct-to-consumer presentation of the interactions
between Senators and the nominee that has become central to the process since the 1980s
(Farganis and Wedeking 2014). Third, and perhaps unique to this instance in history, is that
Kavanaugh’s nomination came at a time of heightened political controversy and polarization
under the Trump Administration (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018). Not only had a
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Republican Senate only months earlier vowed to essentially ignore the nomination of
Merrick Garland to the bench and confirmed a Republican in his place, angered Democrats
retaliated through their own promise of filibuster as the minority party in the Senate. The
Republicans’ invocation of the so-called “nuclear-option,” allowing for a confirmation vote
from 52 instead of the previously establish 60 Senators, was a particularly conflictual tactic
that only widened the partisan divide. Fourth, the administration of President Trump and his
own language in criticizing various judicial actors may add to heightened criticism among
incongruous media organizations, or legitimizing language from those in agreement.
Thus, while the Kavanaugh nomination may in some ways be unique in the history
of Supreme Court nominations, there remains good reason to believe that his nomination
process is not entirely removed from a broader conceptualization of the media’s coverage of
judicial events, in particular, Supreme Court nominations. While his nomination was highly
polarized, his is certainly not the first. While his nomination was covered exhaustively in the
media, his is certainly not the first, and based on the most recent nomination of Amy Coney
Barrett, is certainly not the last. And while his nomination involved serious accusations of
sexual misconduct, again, his is not the first. While the nomination process continues to be
mired in political controversy in recent years, there is little reason to believe this trend will
abate any time soon. More likely, the attention paid to the personal aspects of the nominee,
as opposed to his or her judicial history and philosophy, is only likely to increase. In the
following sections, I outline some of the aspects of the nomination period that may lead to
disparate presentations of the process throughout the media.
3.2.1 Ideological Media’s Role in Nominee Depictions
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One of the first things to consider is that the current media landscape is littered with
a litany of possible media choices, and depending on what sources one consumers, the
subsequent perception of events may vary. While the presence of widespread media bias is
often challenged, it is hard to deny that certain media organizations maintain ideological
reputations. Cable news in particular has gained a notable reputation for creating increased
polarization based on the language and incivility found in its broadcasts (Mutz 2006). Outlets
like Fox News and MSNBC are largely considered to have right and left wing slants,
respectively. If we believe these perceptions to be true, individuals may be consuming vastly
different presentations of the nomination process, especially when it comes to the
involvement of Dr. Blasey Ford and the accusations leveled against the nominee.
Does the media actually politicize Court coverage, or cover the institution’s activities
in different emotional lights? Not only have prior studies shown that negativity is present in
a great deal of coverage (Denison, Wedeking and Zilis 2017; Zilis 2015; Zilis, Wedeking and
Denison 2020), and the prior chapter shows some signs of politicization in decision
coverage, but recent developments in the study of media selectivity suggest the issue is one
of growing importance (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Iyengar and Hahn 2009). Of particular
note is the work of Bartels and Johnston (2012; Johnston and Bartels 2010), who argue that
“sensational” media sources, like those of cable news and talk radio, provide more negative
portrayals of political actors, including the Court. Even after controlling for a number of
potential influences on evaluations of the Court, including a novel conceptualization of
ideological congruence, they find that those who opt to consume information from
“sensational” sources are less supportive of the Court. With a greater diversity of options
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than ever before, including a quickly expanding web of alternative internet sources, more
people are inevitably consuming not only ideological, but negative, news coverage.
While we will return to the impact of Blasey Ford in the nomination, it is worth
noting that one of the major consequences of her involvement was generating a fervor on
both ends of the ideological spectrum. As McGinley (2019) notes, while many in the media,
including at those perceived media outlets like Fox News, were quick to acknowledge the
professionalism and believability of Blasey Ford early on, strong conservative outlets like
Brietbart were quick to downplay her testimony and insist Kavanaugh was the more
believable witness.7 As the nomination process wore on, the difference in tone between
those outlets associated with the right and left seem to have become decidedly clearer. As
one news piece from The Washington Times remarked, “They’ve been the craziest
confirmation hearings in decades — yet they’ve done little to change the trajectory of
Judge Kavanaugh, who still appears headed for a narrow confirmation to the Supreme
Court” (Sherfinski, Swoyer and Dinan 2018). Here, we see what is considered a reliably
conservative outlet in the Times seemingly reassuring its readership that not only have the
hearings been “crazy,” but that Kavanaugh will ultimately surmount the accusations.
Consider this in contrast to an article from The Daily Beast, an online left-leaning publication:
The testimonies could not have been more diametrically opposed: a calm, fearful,
almost apologetic woman recounting the most horrifying moment of her life for
everyone to see, versus an admittedly angry man who warned that what happened to
him would have negative ramifications for decades to come. What played out over
the next nine hours was unlike any Senate hearing in recent memory—with tears,

7

President Trump has been an outspoken fan of Fox News channel for most of his
presidency, and as accusations surrounded Kavanaugh’s nomination, the president
reportedly looked to Fox News to bolster his candidacy and downplay the Blasey Ford
accusations (McGinley 2019).
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anger, fear and pain on full display as lawmakers and the nation looked on. (Kucinich
2018).
Here we see a very different approach when covering the hearings from what is
considered a left-publication. Looking at the direct language used, the author uses very
sympathetic terms for the accuser, Blasey Ford (e.g., calm, fearful) and unflattering,
aggressive terms for the accused, Kavanaugh (i.e., angry). While these are extreme outlets
examples of outlets on the scale to be used in the analysis below (mondotimes.com scores),
even more middle-of-the road outlets made decisions as to what to focus on throughout the
confirmation process. While no friend of the president in recent months, CNN has
traditionally been considered somewhere between Fox News and MSNBC in the
predominant cable news channels available to most Americans. In one article from the
outlet, the authors spend considerable time on one particular exchange between Senator
Amy Klobuchar and then-nominee Brett Kavanaugh, highlighting one of the more infamous
or powerful moments in the public hearings:
"You're asking about blackout, I don't know, have you?" he responded.
"Could you answer the question, judge?" Klobuchar said, looking somewhat
surprised by the response. "So, you have, that's not happened? Is that your answer."
"Yeah, and I'm curious if you have," he added.
"I have no drinking problem, judge," she said, her timing running out.
"Nor do I," Kavanaugh concluded (Bradner and Lee 2018).
This in and of itself is not that telling of the outlet’s take on the exchange, simply
opting to pluck out this particular back-and-forth. Again, one way of interpreting the
exchange simply reproduced in print would be to say that Kavanaugh is aggressive in his
rebuttal, particularly when considering it is not Klobuchar going through a public hearing
regarding her past. Another would be to suggest that Kavanaugh is standing his ground in
what could be considered an inappropriate line of questioning, not unlike now-Justice
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Thomas’s famous remark during his own contentious testimony in which he referred to the
line of questioning regarding sexual harassment of Anita Hill as a “high-tech lynching.”
It is the CNN approach that many may suggest would be a lack of bias – what Fox
News, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, may suggest is a matter of, “We report, you decide.” But
the drama of the event left few without commentary of some sort to add to the exchange.
The reporters at CNN finish their thought on the exchange by noting, “The exchange was a
bizarre turn in a hearing full of surprises and Kavanaugh, seemingly aware that he had
crossed a line with his responses, apologized after the committee took a short break”
(Bradner and Lee 2018). Here we see CNN editorialize to a certain degree, suggesting
Kavanaugh had backed down and apologized due to the intensity of the exchange. This is to
say nothing of the more parodied declaration of Kavanaugh’s, in which he tells the
committee, “We drank beer. I liked beer,” focused on by less news-centric outlets like
Buzzfeed and parodied on comedic television like Matt Damon’s portrayal of Kavanaugh for
‘Saturday Night Live.’
While these are selected excerpts from individual outlets found in the collected data,
there is a modicum of facial validity found in these few examples. We can see some
differentiation in the tone and language selected among various outlets covering the same
event in the Kavanaugh saga, the public hearings. The ideological slant of news
organizations is a hotly contested topic in both political and media studies. For reasons
outlined, my expectations are that those outlets with perceived ideological preferences will
cover the Kavanaugh hearings differently based on the preferences of their editorial staffs as
well as their audiences (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010). The following section details how the
time cycle of the Kavanaugh nomination may impact changes in language.
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Undoubtedly the most dramatic aspect of now-Justice Kavanaugh’s nomination was
the accusation and subsequent testimony of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford. After a period of
reported deliberation, Dr. Blasey Ford initially submitted a confidential letter to Senator
Dianne Feinstein detailing her accusations against the nominee, alleging that Kavanaugh had
sexually assaulted her when both were teenagers in high school in Maryland. Feinstein
promised not to reveal her identity, and the letter of accusation went through a great deal of
scrutiny by investigative agencies, politicians and the media. After watching her claims play
out for several weeks, Dr. Blasey Ford made the decision to come forward as the author of
the letter, and on September 27, 2018, she would speak publicly before the Senate Judiciary
Committee regarding her accusations. Kavanaugh then took the opportunity to respond. In
what appeared to be highly emotional testimonies by both sides, these public hearings would
produce some of the most controversial media coverage of the entire nomination. Blasey
Ford’s accusations create serious questions on both sides of the ideological aisle, including
whether the assault accusations were credible, whether Kavanaugh had the temperament to
sit on the Court, whether Democrats had conspired to spoil the nominee’s credibility.
3.2.2 The News Cycle of the Kavanaugh Nomination
As the prior paragraphs illustrate, the nomination of Justice Kavanaugh included
some important and distinctive elements not always found in Supreme Court nominations.
Therefore, it is important to note that there are a number of reasons for why we expect to
see disparity in coverage throughout the nomination cycle of Kavanaugh, including
temporal, institutional and ideological factors. Perhaps the most obvious consideration for
tone differentiation in coverage is temporal, both as a matter of coverage within specific time
periods of the nomination cycle, as well as general trends over the duration of the
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nomination cycle. One would expect that the confirmation hearings and subsequent vote
would generate greater attention, and more disparate presentations across the media
spectrum, as the increase in attention would lead to more enhanced focus on the conflict
between the nominee (and/or President Trump as his appointer) and Democrats. As each
document includes the date that it was published, it is possible to analyze these temporal
issues. However, while the initial announcement of Kavanaugh’s nomination, or any
Supreme Court nomination announcement, may have received a disproportionate amount of
attention, as the media (and consequently the public) began to learn more about the nominee
and the alleged history of the individual, a greater focus on politicization and negativity over
time is likely (Spill Solberg and Waltenburg 2015).
Further regarding this temporal aspect, the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh can be
broken down into a series of events that, while somewhat unique to this individual
nomination, would come to define much of the media narrative. The first major event is of
course the nomination itself, announced by Donald Trump on July 9, 2018, in the East
Room of the White House. The second major event is the confirmation hearings conducted
by the Senate Judiciary Committee beginning on September 4. The period between these
two events will be referred to from hereon as Period 1.
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The third major event is Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s accusation of sexual assault.
Initially, Blasey Ford sent her accusation to Senator Dianne Feinstein, a Democrat from
California, with a request the accusation remain confidential. While the accusation was
initially sent to Feinstein on July 30, 2018, the public would not become aware of the
accusation until September 12. Blasey Ford would come forward as the accuser on
September 16. Based on the enhanced level of coverage following Dr. Blasey Ford coming
forward, this date will serve as the beginning of this next time period. Public hearings
involving Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford took place in the Senate following the doctor’s
allegations on September 24. The period from the confirmation hearings to the revelation of
the accuser will be referred to as Period 2. The final major event in this study is the eventual
confirmation of Kavanaugh by a full Senate vote of 50-48 on October 6, 2018. The time
period from the Blasey Ford accusation and this final vote will be referred to as Period 3.
Figure 3.1 visualizes the amount of coverage across all outlets over time, split by the time
periods discussed. Lending some credence to the idea of these people the major time periods
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of note, the data shows large spikes at the initial nomination period, the beginning of the
confirmation hearings, and during the Blasey Ford hearings.
For tone, I will be analyzing three different aspects – politicization, negativity and
legalistic language. I use these three dependent variables as each provides a different and
distinct dimension of tone that is important. Politicization is an understanding of how the
media puts the Court and its activities into a political context through emphasis on ideology
and inter-branch relationships. Alternatively, negativity is a consideration of the media’s use
of more hostile language regarding the hearings. Finally, legalistic language in media coverage
signifies a tone that emphasizes non-politicized language that focuses on traditional legal
concerns untethered to the other types of tone described (Johnson and Socker 2012).
As I detail below, there are reasons to believe that ideological outlets will approach
coverage in different ways within the framework of the time periods discussed above. In
other words, during each individual time period, there is an opportunity for outlets to
heighten or tamp down politicized, negative, or legalistic portrayals of the nomination. This
will help to provide a better understanding of the nomination cycle, as well as what events
specifically drive changes in tone, if any.
3.2.3 Period 1: Nomination to Confirmation Hearings
Period 1 involves the initial public learning period of future Justice Kavanaugh, in
which the media first acknowledges the nomination and begins to reveal information about
the nominee. For politicization in this time period, I expect as the ideological leaning of the
outlet to be a crucial factor and that, given the timing sequence of the events just discussed,
will interact with the time period variable. I expect that politicization will increase for liberal
outlets and for conservative outlets. I expect this because the media will be explaining the
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consequences of the nomination, comparing Kavanaugh’s conservative credentials in
comparison to his potential predecessor Kennedy, as well as explanation of the process
through which Kavanaugh will have to traverse. In other words, language regarding ideology
and institutional competition will be prevalent for ideological outlets. This is in comparison
to those outlets considered neutral. While this may seem counterintuitive for those
conservative outlets who may want to focus in on less controversial aspects of the
nomination, like the nominee’s approach to the law in general, there is also an opportunity to
prepare the conservative base for the inevitable confirmation battle to come. In preparation
for the hearings and eventual vote, the presence of more politicized language may serve as a
way of painting ideological foes as overtly partisan. Therefore, I expect:
H1: In Period 1, liberal outlets will be use more politicized language than neutral outlets.
H2: In Period 1, conservative outlets will use more politicized language than neutral outlets.
In regard to negativity, I expect results to differ slightly. As this construct is more
focused on purely emotional words, there are greater reasons for negativity among liberal
outlets. As Kavanaugh was noted early as a strong conservative, a Federalist Society member,
and of course, a Trump nominee, liberal outlets would be far more likely to use negative
language regarding the nominee. Again, because this time period focuses most on the reveal
of the nominee until the confirmation hearings, one would expect this to be a time period of
initial reactions on both sides. Conservatives have far greater reason to tamp down negative
language regarding the nomination, as Kavanaugh was touted by some as being a stronger
conservative than his predecessor. Therefore, I expect:
H3: In Period 1, liberal outlets will use more negative language than neutral or conservative outlets.
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Our final consideration regarding language use in Time 1 addresses the idea of legal
language. As legal language focuses much more on judicial process and procedure, there is a
good reason to expect that outlets on one side of the ideological spectrum would be more
inclined to promote legal language than the other. I expect that conservatives will use more
legal language in this time period, highlighting his prior time on the bench and the positive
aspects of not only law, but Kavanaugh’s legal character. While not inherently a proxy for
positive coverage, legal language at the very least steers away from the ideological nature of
tone and promotes or reinforces greater positivity toward the institution (Johnson and
Socker 2012; also see Gibson and Nelson 2017). Alternatively, liberal outlets have more
incentive to focus on other aspects of Kavanaugh’s nomination and steer away to some
extent from foci dominantly on legal language. Therefore, I expect:
H4: In Period 1, liberal outlets will use less legal language than neutral or conservative outlets.
Period 3.2.4 Confirmation Hearings to Accusation
The second time period of note follows the original Judiciary Committee
confirmation hearings up to the accusations of sexual assault by Dr. Blasey Ford. This period
will include the confirmation hearings but end before the public acknowledgement of Blasey
Ford. In this time period, some expectations change among the ideological outlets involved
in coverage, particularly due to the nature of confirmation hearings themselves.
Furthermore, as this is traditionally the only period of the confirmation process that is
public, and usually subject to the most media coverage and public attention (Farganis and
Wedeking 2014), there will be new considerations for media outlets regarding what kind of
information they choose to cover, as well as how they cover it.
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Regarding politicization, the confirmation hearings themselves bring in more
information about the Senate and Senate Judiciary Committee. Along with this information
comes a greater ability to comment on the exchanges between the nominee and members of
the committee, as well as continued dialog about the ideological nature of both. Thus, there
is reason to expect both liberal and conservative outlets to use more politicized language than
those neutral outlets. What information they focus on specifically is less important than the
idea that these ideological outlets take the opportunity to politicize the event, in particular.
This is to say, as opposed to simply providing the consumer with information about what
exactly happened during the hearings and subsequent deliberation in the chamber, these
ideological outlets are likely to take an opportunity to contextualize the situation. One
example from Paul Blumenthal at the Huffington Post under the headline ‘Brett
Kavanaugh’s Confirmation Hearings Have Been Shrouded in Secrecy’ (2018) goes on to
focus on the Democrats’ complaints that both the judiciary committee and the public were
not given adequate information about the nominee, going so far as to suggest the committee
may want to delay hearings until some of the records are properly revealed.
Nonetheless, the reality of this nomination was a Republican appointee going before
a Republican controlled Senate Judiciary, as well as chamber, with many Democratic
senators still reeling over the nomination and confirmation of Neil Gorsuch. In addition,
when covering the confirmation hearings, there should be an expectation that there will
indeed be ideological differences in how senators interact with the nominee. As Farganis and
Wedeking (2014) and Ringhand and Collins (2013) note, there is a notable difference in how
like-minded senators question the nominee versus those of an opposing party. It is quite
likely that even in simply relating the events of the day, some contentious language from the
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floor will be included in coverage. In comparison to neutral outlets, I expect that ideological
outlets will focus in some extent on the vilification of their political foes, with liberal outlets
pointing at Republican senators and the nominee as partisans, and conservative outlets doing
the same regarding Senate Democrats and liberal detractors. Therefore, I hypothesize:
H5: In Period 2, liberal outlets will use more politicized language than neutral outlets.
H6: In Period 2, conservative outlets will use more politicized language than neutral outlets.
The judiciary committee hearing is also an opportunity for more negative focus, as
for the first time in the process, you have direct confrontation between the nominee and
potential detractors on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Nevertheless, I expect liberal news
outlets will use more negative language than that of conservative or neutral organization. I
expect this because I anticipate a greater focus from liberal organizations on the questions
posed by Democrats on the committee, some of which were far more critical of the nominee
than those posed by largely like-minded Republicans. For example, in the initial hearing,
Democratic Senator Dick Durbin remarked to Kavanaugh, “You are the nominee of
President Donald John Trump. This is a president who has shown us consistently that he is
contemptuous of the rule of law. It’s that president who has decided you are his man.” This
of course runs counter to the kind of language used by Judiciary Chair, Republican Chuck
Grassley, in the same hearing: “Judge Kavanaugh is one of the most qualified nominees – if
not the most qualified nominee – I have ever seen.”
Additionally, while it is quite possible that conservative outlets would highlight
negativity in the hearings perhaps in an attempt to discredit the line of questioning by those
on the Democratic side, as Republicans compared the proceedings at various times to an out
of control mob, I expect they will use less negative language than liberal outlets or neutral
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outlets, as they have more incentive to accentuate positive attributes of the nomination and
his performance. For example, in their coverage of the confirmation hearings, Fox News
devoted considerable time not only to the protests within the chamber and the objections of
Democratic Senators to the proceedings, but also the nominee’s lengthy responses to
matters of judicial temperament, legal philosophy, and more flattering aspects of the
nominee (Pappas 2018). Therefore, I expect:
H7: In Period 2, liberal outlets will use more negative language than conservative or neutral outlets.
Finally, in regard to legal language, this would be perhaps the most apt time for a
greater focus by some outlets on stricter elements of the law. That is to say, much of the
confirmation process focuses on the nominee’s understanding of the law itself, prior
precedent, and procedural elements of the Court (Collins and Ringwald 2013; Farganis and
Wedeking 2014). Yet again, there is a potentially greater incentive for one side to perhaps
focus on this type of narrative than the other. Conservative outlets may focus more on legal
language as a way of promoting a more straight-forward view of the nominee, as opposed to
an ideologue. Once again, Fox News provides a good example in their decision to dedicate a
considerable amount of space to the judicial philosophy of Kavanaugh, who claimed in the
hearing, “A judge must be independent and must interpret the law, not make the law”
(Pappas 2018). I expect less legal language from liberal outlets than conservative outlets, as
there is less incentive to focus on the standard answers often given regarding things like
judicial philosophy. However, there is still a strong incentive to focus elsewhere as a way of
convincing readership of the nominee’s ideological credentials and his chance at winning
confirmation. Thus, it is quite likely that both conservative and liberal outlets will use less
legal language than their neutral counterparts.
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H8: In Period 2, liberal outlets will use less legal language than neutral or conservative outlets.
H9: In Period 2, conservative outlets will use less language than neutral outlets.
Period 3.2.5 Accusation to Confirmation
The final time period is somewhat unique, but not unprecedented, within Supreme
Court nominations. The previous nomination of Neil Gorsuch had much more controversy
surrounding it than most prior nominations, but for very different reasons.8 Perhaps a more
analogous example would be that of Clarence Thomas, a Bush nominee similarly accused of
sexual impropriety prior to his nomination in 1991. Regardless, the accusation of sexual
assault by Dr. Blasey Ford was a tremendous turning point in terms of media focus about
the nomination. And perhaps at no point were ideological lines more deeply entrenched,
which many liberals believing there to be little reason to not believe the accusation and
subsequent testimony of Blasey Ford, thus discrediting the nomination of Kavanaugh as
unfit for office. Many on the right countered that Kavanaugh himself was creditable and
challenged some of the aspects of an accusation about an event that happened decades
before. To a large extent, ideological media coverage followed in similar division.
The opportunity for politicization is rife for both sides, as both engaged in a certain
of ideological finger-pointing. I expect that liberal outlets will have more politicized language
in their coverage during Time 3 simply because of the ideological nature of the nomination
and the Senate renewed involvement. However, I expect that conservative outlets will

8

The Gorsuch nomination, while no less politicized in nature, largely centered around Senate Republicans’
decision to ignore the nomination of Merrick Garland by the Obama Administration. Republicans cited the
upcoming presidential election as their reasoning to wait. Fortuitously, the Republican Donald Trump won the
election and was able to fill the seat with a Republican, despite Obama being the president at the time of
vacancy. A similar election-year nomination debate would happen again in 2020, culminating in Republicans
quickly filling the seat of the deceased Ruth Bader Ginsburg before election day.
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engage in similar behavior, also maintaining a strong focus on the ideological division
between those who believe the accuser and the accused. Therefore, I expect:
H10: In Period 3, liberal outlets will use more politicized language than neutral outlets.
H11: In Period 3, conservative outlets will use more politicized language than neutral outlets.
Similar to the potential increase in politicization by both liberal and conservative
outlets in Time 3, I expect there to be a similar pattern regarding negative language. Again,
liberal outlets are likely focused on the negative aspects of the nominee to an even greater
extent than before, as well as the conservative attempting to discredit the accuser. However,
among conservative outlets, there is similar negativity toward said accuser and Democrats
they may believe to be “railroading” their nominee based on his conservative, rather than
any credible claim of assault. Neutral outlets are likely to shy away from negative emotional
language in comparison. Therefore, I expect:
H12: In Period 3, liberal outlets will use more negative language than neutral outlets.
H13: In Period 3, conservative outlets will use more negative language than neutral outlets.
Finally, the discussion of legal language is an interesting one for a number of reasons.
While this is a highly emotionally charged period, it also ends in a confirmation vote that
likely received a considerable amount of coverage that focused on procedural issues.
Nevertheless, as we are approaching these latent constructs as percentages of text devoted to
these particular concepts, there are reasons to believe a lesser degree of legal language will be
used among more ideological outlets. In other words, while there may be a certain level of
legal language found in ideological coverage of Time 3, I expect its magnitude would pale in
comparison to politicization and negativity. Alternatively, I would expect neutral outlets to
use comparatively greater degrees of legal language in their texts. Therefore, I expect:
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H14: In Period 3, liberal outlets will use less legal language than neutral outlets.
H15: In Period 3, conservative outlets will use less legal language than neutral outlets.
Table 3.1: Expectations of Tone Comparison Within-Time Period by Outlet Ideology

Period 1
Period 2
Period 3

Politicization

Negativity

Legalistic

Liberal: +
Conservative: +
Liberal: +
Conservative: +
Liberal: +
Conservative: +

Liberal: +

Liberal: -

Liberal: +

Liberal: Conservative: Liberal: Conservative: -

Liberal: +
Conservative: +

3.3 Data and Methods
This chapter utilizes a unique dataset of news articles covering the Supreme Court
nomination process of Brett Kavanaugh. Using an online text-scraping technique developed
by Wedeking and Zilis (2021), the dataset is comprised of 1,323 individual articles flagged as
covering the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh from the initial discussion of the
announcement on July 9, 2018 to the conclusion of the confirmation on October 8, 2018.
Though all articles were collected through online sources, the sample includes articles from
30 different outlets that utilize either print, broadcast or digital formats.9 These organizations
were selected for their diversity, representing not only different formats, but ideological
leanings, geographic regions, ownership and circulation sizes.
3.3.1 Dependent Variables

9

The full list of organizations included in the sample: ABC, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, Associated Press, The
Daily Beast, The Boston Globe, CBS, CNN, The Christian Science Monitor, The Chicago Sun Times, The Chicago Tribune,
The Daily Kos, Dallas Morning News, Fox News, Fox Business, The Huffington Post, The Los Angeles Times, MSNBC,
NBC, Newsmax, National Public Radio, The New York Post, The New York Times, Politico, Reuters, Salon,
SCOTUSblog, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and The Washington Times.
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This analysis relies upon three separate dependent variables representing different
latent constructs related to tone of coverage. The first, politicization, follows a similar
strategy as used in the first empirical chapter regarding coverage of Supreme Court decisions
inspired by Johnson and Socker’s (2012) work on coverage of the Court. The second,
negativity, follows previous work on negativity in coverage of Supreme Court activities (e.g.,
Zilis, Wedeking and Denison 2020). Finally, the last dependent variable concerns legal
language, again following Johnson and Socker’s (2012) work on media coverage of the
Court. The following paragraphs will outline the basis for these dependent variables before
moving on toward a discussion of the independent variables used in the subsequent analyses.
The first dependent variable is a percentage-based measure of politicized words and
phrases found within each article. As stated previously, the compiled dictionary of words and
phrases alludes to coalitions and ideology, as found in Johnson and Socker (2012), but also
the inter-branch relationships among governmental actors. These include terms like “liberal”
and “conservative,” “wing,” “median justice,” and “Republican Party.” As an example of
how these kinds of terms find their way into coverage of the nomination, one article from
CNN published on August 28, 2018 focused not only the judicial history of the nominee,
but also the ideological strategies of his presentation before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
The article primarily highlights that one of the individuals tasked with introducing the
nominee would be Lisa Blatt, described throughout as a notable “liberal” who in editorials
urged her fellow “Democrats” to support the nomination of Kavanaugh (de Vogue and
Tatum 2018). Another from the more conservative Washington Times notes that
Kavanaugh is a “favorite of the conservative Washington legal establishment,” whose
connection to the impeachment of Bill Clinton and voting history on high profile cases will
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help to “move the high court under conservatives’ control for decades to come” (Boyer and
Swoyer 2018).
The second dependent variable is negativity in media tone. To capture this latent
construct, I use the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) dictionary. In particular, I
use LIWC’s negative emotional words dictionary. LIWC’s negative emotional words
dictionary has been used extensively in judicial scholarship, including work on opinion
content (e.g., Black, Owens, Wedeking and Wohlfarth 2016; Owens and Wedeking 2011), as
well as media coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court (Denison, Wedeking and Zilis 2020; Zilis,
Wedeking and Denison 2017).
Finally, the third dependent variable in the analyses is that of legal language. Using a
dictionary created and validated by Johnson and Socker (2012), this construct focuses on the
use of language that is more concerned with legal functions and procedure, like “strict
scrutiny,” “jurisprudence,” or “original intent.” Unlike politicized or negative language, this
legal language strays away from discussion of ideology or emotion, instead providing a
measure of focus that concentrates almost entirely on the Court and the nominee as legal
actors.
After constructing dictionaries of politicized, negative emotional, and legal terms, the
news articles are then parsed using the Quanteda text analysis package, providing total
counts for each applied dictionary. These count totals are then divided by the total words in
each article, creating a percentage for each measure based on each individual article. These
percentages represent the conceptualization the media portrayals of the Supreme Court,
addressing variance in each of our latent constructs. As each construct is presented as a
percent, I will use ordinary least squares regression modeling to analyze the data.
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Based on correlation coefficients, the measures are not strongly correlated,
suggesting they are indeed measuring different latent constructs. Politicization and negativity
are correlated at -.17 (p<.001), politicization and legalistic language are correlated at -.04
(p<.01) and negativity and legal language are correlated at -.09 (p<.001).
3.3.2 Independent Variables
The main independent variables of interest are those of time and outlet ideology.
Beginning with the consideration of time, several variables are employed to account for time
in the analyses. The first of which concerns the time periods discussed in the theory section
previously. Articles have been divided into three distinct time periods. Period 1 accounts for
the dates from the announcement of the nomination and ends before the initial confirmation
hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Period 2 begins with the date of the
confirmation hearings and ends prior to the reveal of Dr. Blasey Ford as an alleged sexual
assault victim of Judge Kavanaugh in their youth. Last, Period 3 begins with the
aforementioned reveal and ends with Kavanaugh’s eventual confirmation before the full
Senate. For the purposes of analyzing within-period differences, separate models will be
utilized for articles falling within each of these time periods. When looking at changes in
tone and language over time, the variable will be treated as a three-group categorical variable.
Additionally, I include a simple date variable represented by the number of days into the
nomination cycle the article was published (i.e., July 9 = 1; July 10 = 2; July 11 = 3, etc.).
There are 93 days accounted for in the nomination cycle from beginning to end. Period 2
begins on day 57 and Period 3 begins on day 69. Finally, to account for the possibility of a
non-linear relationship between tone and time, I also include a date squared control, created
using the aforementioned date system.
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The other major independent variable is that of outlet ideology. Using
mondotimes.com user scores of perceived ideology of each outlet, I recode their 5-point
ideology scale (1 being liberal and 5 people conservative) into a 3-point scale, in which 1 is
the liberal category (those outlets deemed to be liberal or lean liberal in the mondotimes.com
ratings), 2 is the neutral category, and 3 is for those outlets considered conservative or
leaning conservative. Mondo provides information on nearly 17,000 news organizations,
with more than 60,000 users contributing scores for individual ideological affiliations.
Mondotimes.com scores have been used in a number of studies regarding political
communication and media bias (e.g., Denison, Wedeking, and Zilis 2020; Ho and Quinn
2008).
To provide some descriptive visualization of how the dependent variables look over
time for all outlets, Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 are scatter plots of these relationships with a
loess smoother and identifiers for each time period. Looking at all three figures collectively,
there are obvious spikes in each of the dependent variables, often at very similar times. In
particular, outlets saw a spike in politicized and negative language around the day 81 mark,
September 27, as the special hearings for Blasey Ford and Kavanaugh began, arguably the
most contentious moment in the nomination cycle. Comparing trends in politicization and
negativity in Figures 2 and 3, while distinct measures, both show increases toward the end of
the nomination cycle as the Blasey Ford hearings take place and the confirmation vote nears.
Finally, while not a dramatic swing by any means, legal language appears to be higher during
the confirmation hearing period and wane in the last stage of the nomination period,
suggesting that coverage quickly steered away from matters of judicial philosophy and
toward other areas of focus. While not a definitive test of change over time, these figures do
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provide some optimism regarding how various aspects of tone ebbed and flowed throughout
the nomination cycle based on events identified. This also suggests the variables are
capturing noticeable elements of media tone and the events identified as critical in the
nomination cycle may be driving some of these differences in coverage.
I also look at how these dependent variables change over time based on the ideology
of the outlet. Looking first at politicized language over time in Figure 3.5, we see spikes in
politicization during the times identified as critical moments in the process. Period 1 shows a
high beginning point for liberal outlets and moderately high start for conservative outlets
that would begin to wane until the confirmation hearings. All ideology types then spike in
the last period of the nomination in the middle of the second hearings involving Blasey
Ford. So, while we see some differentiation in the level of politicization they offer
throughout the confirmation process, we also ultimately see more at different key points in
the nomination.
I also look at how these dependent variables change over time based on the ideology
of the outlet. Looking first at politicized language over time in Figure 5, we see spikes in
politicization during the times identified as critical moments in the process. Period 1 shows a
high beginning point for liberal outlets and moderately high start for conservative outlets
that would begin to wane until the confirmation hearings. All ideology types then spike in
the last period of the nomination in the middle of the second hearings involving Blasey
Ford. So, while we see some differentiation in the level of politicization they offer
throughout the confirmation process, we also ultimately see more descriptive support for the
time period selections.
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Figure 3.2: Politicized Language Over Time
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Figure 3.3 Negative Language Over Time
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Figure 3.4: Legal Language Over Time
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Figure 3.5: Politicized Language Over Time by Outlet Ideology

0

20

40

60

80

100

Date
Liberal
Conservative

Neutral

Turning to negative language, there is again notable differentiation in tone by outlet
ideology over the time periods, particularly considering the ascendency of negative language
fairly consistently as the stakes of the nomination go up. While both liberal and conservative
outlets start at a nearly identical percentage of negativity in tone at the announcement of
Kavanaugh’s nomination, both exhibit similar responses to the onset of the confirmation
hearings. Finally, in the final period involving the allegations of Blasey Ford, both liberal and
conservative outlets ramp up negativity, with conservative outlets becoming particularly
more negative in tone during this period. This offers some descriptive support for the
expectations of negativity for Periods 2 and 3 regarding liberal and conservative outlets.
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Neutral outlets, meanwhile, take a very different approach throughout the timeline, starting
off with the highest levels of negativity in the initial period, then being comparably less
negative as the nomination goes through the final two periods. This, too, suggests the time
periods selected represent the major events of the nomination as we observe major changes
in tone moving into Period 2 and Period 3.
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Figure 3.6: Negative Language Over Time by Outlet Ideology
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ˆLastly, I include a final scatterplot of legal language over time by outlet ideology,
illustrated in Figure 7. As something of an alternative to the ideas of politicization and
negativity, we should expect some inverted trends here among ideological outlets. Indeed,
while levels of legal language are considerably lower across the board than that of politicized
or negative language, the predicted trends appear to play out. In period one, where many
69

Americans will likely be first introduced to Kavanaugh as a legal figure, outlets are indeed
using moderate levels of legal language. Predictably, as the nomination moves into Period 2
and the confirmation hearings, we see spikes in liberal and neutral outlets. Finally, following
the allegations of Blasey Ford going public and the public hearings involving her and the
nominee, we see a sharp decline in legal language among all outlet types, with only neutral
outlets finishing out their nomination coverage with another increase in legal language.
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Figure 3.7: Legal Language Over Time by Outlet Ideology
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While these figures only depict description representations of the relationship
between two of the major independent variables, time period and outlet ideology, on each
individual dependent construct, they do suggest that the periods identified are strongly
associated with changes in tone, and at different rates by outlet type. While it is unlikely
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nomination coverage for any nominee remains static over time in any of these constructs,
identifying the major events of any nomination may provide valuable information as to how
media cycles flow.
In addition to these variables of tone, time and, ideology, I also include a number of
control variables in the analyses. First, I acknowledge that some of the change in tone may
be a part of the style of the outlet. Bartels and Johnston (2012) identify sensationalism of the
outlet as a major factor in the negativity associated with media coverage of the Supreme
Court. They argue that sensational media outlets, like cable news and talk radio, tend to be
more critical of political institutions, leading to more negative attitudes toward these
institutions among the public. Taking this a step further, it is logical to suggest the
relationship with politicization would be somewhat similar, particularly when considering the
judiciary’s reputation for avoiding being represented as a partisan, politicized institution.
Conversely, I expect that sensational outlets are less likely to focus on the legal aspects of the
nomination process, preferring livelier coverage of the cycle. Sensationalism is treated as a
dichotomous variable. I also control for articles that contain editorial opinions or are
otherwise not “straight” news articles. As I am more concerned with how traditionally
reported news covers the nomination process, it is important to differentiate between the
two. Those articles submitted by analysts or non-reporters are coded as 1 and those written
by the outlet’s own reporters are coded as 0. Finally, I control for the number of tokens in
each article, as even though the dependent variables are treated as percentages, it is possible
that lengthier articles, or outlets that allow for lengthier pieces, may be afforded more space
for editorialization, politicized context, or deeper discussion of legalese. Since the dependent
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variables are fractions, this variable controls for the size of the denominator in each fraction,
operating as a proxy for the amount of attention an outlet devotes to a topic.
3.4 Results
To begin, I split the initial analyses into the three separate time periods discussed
above with results for each dependent variable within each table. The ordinary least-squared
results presented here include a categorical variable for outlet ideology that uses a reference
category of “neutral” outlets, or those not considered to be left or right leaning via
mondotimes.com users’ scores.
Table 3.2: Coverage Tone in Time Period 1: Neutral Reference
Variables

Politicized

Negative

Legal

Liberal Outlet

0.0029***
(0.0009)
0.0009
(0.0009)
-0.0002***
(0.0001)
0.0000**
(0.0000)
0.0020**
(0.0008)
-0.0018*
(0.0010)
-0.0000***
(0.0000)
0.0115***
(0.0010)

-0.0005
(0.0009)
-0.0005
(0.0008)
0.0001*
(0.0001)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0009
(0.0008)
0.0035***
(0.0009)
0.0000***
(0.0000)
0.0097***
(0.0009)

-0.0002
(0.0003)
0.0004
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0007***
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0003)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0016***
(0.0003)

Conservative Outlet
Date
Date Squared
Sensational
Opinion
Tokens
Constant

Observations
666
666
666
R-squared
0.0646
0.0506
0.0359
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Neutral outlets base category.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Starting with polarization as the dependent variable, there is some evidence to
support hypotheses one and two. Looking at Table 3.2, the full model gives some credence
72

to the idea of liberal use of politicization in coverage over the entire duration of the
nomination process, with a modest, but significant coefficient of .0029. Compared to the
neutral category, conservative outlets also trend in the correct direction, but with no
significance. Additionally, sensationalism is also positive and significant in the politicized
language model, as expected. While Period 1 contains the largest amount of stories (n=666),
there is still limited support for my hypotheses. However, when looking at negative and legal
language within Period 1, we see no significance regarding the ideological outlets’ coverage.
Again, in the legal language model, we do see some support for the idea of sensational
outlets being less interested in traditional, legal language.
Moving toward the analysis of Period 2 in Table 3.3, we again find limited significant
results, though the ideology scores do trend in the expected direction. Despite being the
period with the most visible conflict, only the negative language variable yields significant
results in relation to conservative outlets compared to the neutral base category. While this is
the time period with the smallest sample (n=147), I find no support for any of my Period 2
hypotheses, as not only do liberal outlets appear to be less negative than their counterparts,
but the other dependent variables of politicized language and legal language yield no
significant results.
Finally, Period 3, which begins with the reveal of Blasey Ford as the accuser and
ends with Kavanaugh’s eventual confirmation, contributes similar results to the first two.
Looking at Table 3.4, while neither conservative or liberal outlets are distinguishable from
the language used by neutral outlets, the results provided in the appendix do show that
liberal and conservative outlets differed significantly in terms of negativity of coverage in
Period 3. With a modest coefficient of .0019, (p<.05), liberal outlets used less negative
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language than their conservative counterparts. This is particularly interesting, because while
my hypothesis suggested an expectation that liberal outlets would also be more negative in
coverage than neutral outlets, neither was statistically distinguishable from the neutral
category. However, conservative outlets using more negative language than liberal outlets
suggests a certain level of criticism toward Blasey Ford and her testimony, or at the very
least, more negative coverage of the proceedings leading up to the confirmation vote.
Table 3.3: Coverage Tone in Time Period 2: Neutral Reference
Variables

Politicized

Negative

Legal

Liberal Outlet

0.0013
(0.0014)
0.0011
(0.0014)
-0.0087
(0.0078)
0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0009
(0.0013)
-0.0035**
(0.0014)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
0.2870
(0.2407)

0.0016
(0.0016)
0.0040**
(0.0016)
0.0060
(0.0088)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0009
(0.0015)
0.0022
(0.0016)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
0.1618
(0.2723)

-0.0005
(0.0006)
-0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0103***
(0.0032)
-0.0001***
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0005)
-0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.3139***
(0.1000)

Conservative Outlet
Date
Date Squared
Sensational
Opinion
Tokens
Constant

Observations
147
147
147
R-squared
0.0760
0.0965
0.0804
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Neutral outlets base category.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: Coverage Tone in Time Period 3: Neutral Reference (Continued on next page)
Variables
Liberal Outlet
Conservative Outlet

Politicized

Negative

Legal

0.0006
(0.0008)
-0.0007
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-0.0010
(0.0010)
0.0009

-0.0000
(0.0002)
-0.0001

(Table 3.4 Continued)
Date
Date Squared
Sensational
Opinion
Tokens
Constant

(0.0009)
-0.0001
(0.0016)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0002
(0.0008)
-0.0025***
(0.0009)
-0.0000*
(0.0000)
0.0103
(0.0647)

(0.0011)
0.0028
(0.0020)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0013
(0.0010)
0.0073***
(0.0011)
0.0000***
(0.0000)
-0.1024
(0.0817)

(
0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0004)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
-0.0005*
(0.0002)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0002
(0.0177)

Observations
510
510
510
R-squared
0.0272
0.1046
0.0127
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Neutral outlets base category.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.5 Implications
There is little doubt that the news media is the primary way in which Americans
learn about the judiciary and its functions, if they choose to learn about them at all. And
while the nomination cycle of a Supreme Court nominee is decidedly unique, as Americans
are given the opportunity to physically watch the hearings without outlet analysis or simply
read the transcripts, there is still a reliance on the broader news media to interpret the
happenings of the day, or in this case, the happenings of several months of deliberation over
the nominee. As the past few nominations have shown, the nomination of a new Supreme
Court justice may be among the most controversial activities involving the federal judiciary,
perhaps even more so than a landmark decision over a salient issue. With that in mind, it is
important to understand how the Supreme Court tackles the nomination. As the previous
chapter detailed, part of the import of this coverage may be one of ideological selectivity.
With nominees being political appointments from ideological and partisan presidents, and an
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increasingly ideological media environment, there is a possibility that the coverage
Americans receive regarding a Supreme Court nomination is heavily filtered through the lens
of ideological outlets (Peffley, Denison and Taylor 2020). In other words, depending on
where an individual receives their coverage of a nominee, an outlet may be able to bolster
support based on their presentation of events. Alternatively, other outlets may be able to cast
doubt upon the nominee’s fitness for office through less favorable coverage, whether it be
politicized, negative or otherwise.
While the results of this study are decidedly mixed, the relevance of the questions
asked here remains crucial. Not only does the coverage of a nominee potentially alter their
likelihood of confirmation success, it potentially alters Americans’ views of the Supreme
Court as an institution. Justice Kavanaugh’s nomination and subsequent confirmation to the
Court is by no means the normal state of affairs for such an appointment, but many of the
aspects surrounding the controversy of his nomination have become commonplace in
modern politics. Not only was Kavanaugh selected as a reliably conservative judge by a
Republican president who promised to only select strong-willed, conservative originalists,
making his nomination a thorn in the side for many liberals of alternative viewpoints, but
what threw his final confirmation vote into jeopardy involved many of the major political
issues of the day. Justice Kavanaugh became another notable figure in what has become an
ever-growing movement to hold men in power accountable for their actions. The argument
over whether to believe the accuser or the accused divided the nation, including those in the
United States Senate tasked with deciding Kavanaugh’s future. Ultimately, the vote to
confirm and the process by which that confirmation occurred was yet another determination
fueled almost exclusively by partisanship and ideology. Some might argue the public’s
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opinion on Kavanaugh trickled down from the elites forging their arguments over his guilt at
the very top.
Thus, while it was an unusual nomination in many ways, Kavanaugh’s nomination
largely echoes what has been happening for the past two decades, and will likely continue to
happen as polarization marches steadily forward. And while the results of this study do not
adequately clarify how a polarized news environment is impacting general coverage of
nominations, nor the impact that coverage has on attitudes of the institution, it does set up a
framework for moving forward in studies of the nomination process in the media. Moving
forward, it would be beneficial to include nomination coverage of multiple appointments,
Democrat and Republican, including those with more traditional paths through the process.
As such, this work attempts to take a snapshot of a nomination period and suggest that the
ideological preferences at play in most recent nominations would not be all that different,
though perhaps less sensational.
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Chapter 4: Positive Symbolism and Competing Media Narratives in Evaluations of the
Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court has historically been able to maintain relatively high levels
of public support, regardless of the controversial nature of many of its decisions. But there is
recent evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court’s legitimacy can still be affected by salient
decisions (e.g., Bartels and Johnston 2013) and support for the institution is indeed falling as
it becomes more embroiled in the public spectacle of the branches (Strother and Glennon
2021). Nevertheless, how can the institution continue to garner comparably high levels of
support in the midst of such a polarized political environment? One of the more recent
answers to this question revolves around the very presentation of the Supreme Court and
the symbolism surrounding the institution. Building on earlier work that suggests Americans
give asymmetrical weight to decisions they agree with versus ones they do not (Gibson and
Caldeira 2009c), Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson (2014) offer a theory as to how this
acquiescent positivity toward the Supreme Court develops in the first place. In line with
much of the recent work regarding motivated reasoning (see Lodge and Taber 2013), they
suggest that Americans are consistently exposed to positive symbolism in relation to the
institution. These symbols, like the stately robe or the “cathedral-like” courthouse itself, are
suggested to be subconsciously absorbed throughout a lifetime, creating what is often an
instantaneous positive response to the Supreme Court. When moving beyond this
instantaneous thought into a more deliberative consideration of the Supreme Court, those
positive symbols remain as a forceful motivator in the evaluation. Even in recognizing the
Supreme Court acted in a displeasing way, these positive associations remain branded in
subconscious thought.
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To address how far this positive symbolism indeed reaches, if at all, I use an online
survey experiment to see whether these positive symbols are capable of tamping down the
influence of politicized coverage of the Court. While the Court attempts to avoid much of
the politicization found in other branches, opting not to participate in discussions of their
opinions or defend the work of the institution at large, recent research shows that negativity
bias is impactful in the public’s assessment of Supreme Court activity (Christenson and Glick
2019). Therefore, it is worth asking the question of whether the positivity theory posited by
Gibson and others is capable of surmounting textual content that puts the Supreme Court in
a politicized role, a role which the Court intentionally tries to avoid?
As mentioned earlier, legitimacy, or diffuse support, of the Supreme Court is
increasingly becoming among the most studied aspects of judicial politics. The reason for
this widespread interest is because the Court relies so heavily on its legitimacy to be a truly
impactful institution, and one that can stand toe to toe with other institutional actors. The
judiciary’s inability to enforce its own decisions lends to a unique need for public support;
should public opinion of the Supreme Court wane too heavily, the American public and their
elected representatives will likely do very little to enact the policies handed down (Clark
2009; Hall 2014; Nelson and Uribe-McGuire 2017). This diffuse support for the institution is
even more essential when considering that the Supreme Court stands as a countermajoritarian institution, one in which nearly a third of its decisions run against the
preferences of the American population (Graber 2008). The justices themselves appear to be
quite aware of this vulnerability, particularly as they move into an era of greater activism and
political controversy (Farganis 2012). As Justice Kennedy noted in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
“the Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances
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in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation”
(865-866). For the institution to survive, it must maintain legitimacy, even when handing
down disliked decisions. The question is, how does an unelected institution that so often
rules against public opinion maintain the public support necessary to maintain its power?
4.1 Maintaining Support at the U.S. Supreme Court
The literature on the maintenance of legitimacy, or institutional support, is extensive
and diverse, but there are a few major points to emphasize. Overall, diffuse support for the
Supreme Court is indeed relatively high compared to the other branches, and while there are
deviations over time and within certain groups (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and
Caldeira 1992), this has until recently been fairly stable. Following a number of high-profile
and controversial nominations, and increased polarization that trickles down into the
confirmation process these levels of support have dropped (Strother and Glennon 2020).
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons suggested for why some individuals express
greater support than others. Most notably, knowledge of and exposure to the Supreme Court
is a consistent factor in more favorable evaluations (e.g., Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, Gibson
and Caldeira 2009b; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 2009), and even an acknowledgment of
some of its more politicized elements per legal realism does not necessarily detract from
support (Gibson and Caldeira 2011). While it may seem counterintuitive to suggest that
those with a greater understanding of the realities of legal decision making would still be very
supportive of the judiciary, even those in the legal profession tend to ascribe high levels of
legitimacy to the Supreme Court, but for certainly unique reasons (Bartels, Johnston, and
Mark 2015).
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Political conflict and directional disagreement also lead to fluctuations in legitimacy.
Congressional hostility, for instance, is shown to substantially reduce the Court’s incentives
to exercise judicial review, likely out of fear of losing public support (Clark 2009).
Divisiveness on the Court appears to indirectly lead to less public support, as Americans
become more exposed to conflict and dissenting behavior (Zilis 2015). Recent contentious
judicial nominations also appear to have hurt support of Court, but the longevity of those
dips are yet to be seen (Krewson and Schroedel 2020). Even the public rhetoric of justices
seems to be able to alter support (Strother and Glennon 2021). And notably, a great deal of
attention has been paid to the influence of public opinion and judicial responsiveness, with
some suggesting the Court reacts to the public to curb backlash (Casillas, Enns and
Wohlfarth 2011; McGuire and Stimson 2004).
To this latter point, Bartels and Johnston (2020) push back against a rather
sentimental answer as to why the Court maintains the power that is does. They claim that
while many make the argument that the courts are general protected against polarized
political elites by a public that recognizes their import, in actuality the public is no less
immune to fickleness and politicized responses to branch. They argue that not even the
Court, often heralded as not only the counter-majoritarian branch but the most sober in its
output, is immune to the increased polarization of American politics. If given the chance,
partisan Americans are quite fine with limiting the powers of a Court that does not decide in
their favor.
While the literature on how the Court may lose or gain support from the public is
extensive, and this is merely the tip of the iceberg, the focus of this study is address the
broader topic of how the Courts have managed to maintain greater levels of support than
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the other branches. And while it is possible the answer is simply one of their shyness toward
politicized brawling or their reluctance to justify their actions, there are reasons to believe
that this relative maintenance of support could be due to any number of factors that deal
with either the Court itself, the citizenry, or the media’s influence on the institution’s
presentation.
4.1.1 Positivity Theory and Motivated Reasoning
The U.S. Supreme Court does maintain greater support than other branches, and
recent research based in psychology purports to have an answer as to why. Building on
earlier work that suggests Americans give asymmetrical weight to decisions they agree with
versus ones they do not, Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson (2014) offer a theory as to how this
acquiescent positivity toward the Supreme Court develops in the first place. In line with
much of the recent work in motivated reasoning (see Lodge and Taber 2013), they suggest
that Americans are consistently exposed to positive symbolism in relation to the institution.
These symbols, like the stately robe or the “cathedral-like” courthouse itself, are suggested to
be subconsciously absorbed throughout a lifetime, creating what is an instantaneous positive
response to the Supreme Court. When moving beyond this instantaneous thought into a
more deliberative consideration of the Supreme Court, those positive symbols remain as a
forceful motivator in the evaluation. Even in recognizing the Supreme Court acted in a
displeasing way, these positive associations remain branded in subconscious thought.
The theory of motivated political reasoning relies heavily on psychological research
into what is often called a “dual processing” aspect of memory. As Kahneman (2011)
argues, there are essentially two types of judgment processing that operate at different levels.
System 1 is based on subconscious thought, suggesting that the mind is able to make nearly
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instantaneous judgments based on information already stored in the subconscious memory,
while System 2 is based on more deliberative thought and can be considered a slower mental
process to come to judgment. Motivated political reasoning, and positivity theory in turn,
suggest that the mind has already stored subconscious thoughts that when faced with certain
judgments may be automatically triggered. As Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson (2014) argue,
the Supreme Court and its work is not immune to these kind of immediate associations
(Collins and Loftus 1975; Neely 1977). As the authors explain, per prior work by Lodge and
Taber (2012):
Through previously learned mental associations, the first subconscious steps down
the stream of processing establish the rudimentary meaning of the event, positive or
negative affect, and motivational goals. The associations, rudimentary meanings, and
goals activated by this stimulus then enter conscious processing and the operations
of System 2 begin. Thus, only at the tail end of the decision stream does one become
consciously aware of the associated thoughts and feelings unconsciously generated
moments earlier in response to an external stimulus (Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson
2014, 842).
The argument is one that has seen interesting results in past studies. For instance, the
Butz, Plant and Doer (2007) study cited by the authors makes a compelling argument that
symbolism can have a significant effect on what could be potentially hostile attitudes. In
their study, respondents exposed to the U.S. flag were actually less likely to show hostility
toward Muslims, as respondents seemed to associate the flag itself with egalitarianism. Based
on this reasoning, Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson (2014) posit that for many Americans,
there is a prior association with the U.S. Supreme Court that can be activated through the
use of positive imagery or symbolism. The authors admit that these effects are however
conditional on other factors, including extensive exposure to the Court that would dampen
any effect from a symbol, prior support of the Court, and the level of disappointment
someone feels toward the Court’s decisions.
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The authors test this positivity theory through an experimental design measuring
acquiescence to a disliked decision that exposes one treatment group to judicial symbols,
while the other receives an abstract image. They find that the presence of a judicial symbol is
essentially equal to the possession of high knowledge of the Court, one of the leading
explanations of support (Gibson and Caldeira 2009) lending credence to the idea of positive
symbolism’s role in crafting positive evaluations of the institution for certain groups. Those
without prior extensive knowledge of the Court, for instance, are most likely to be
influenced by positive symbolism.
While the extant literature makes a strong case for positivity theory’s power, there
are reasons to believe that positive imagery alone cannot entirely negate the presence of
more critical, language based coverage. Research focusing solely on critical or non-legalistic
coverage of the judiciary shows that language selection in itself, or the presence of critical
frames, can motivate more negative evaluations of the institution (Ramirez 2008; Zilis 2015).
We also know that negative, critical and politicized coverage indeed exists. As evinced earlier,
under certain circumstances, particularly those that suggest internal conflict and division on
the Court, media outlets use more politicized or negative language (Denison, Wedeking and
Zilis 2020; Johnson and Socker 2012; Zilis, Wedeking, and Denison 2017), and said coverage
does lead to less institutional support overall (Zilis 2015). In this same vein, Bartels and
Johnston (2012; Johnston and Bartels 2010) find that those individuals who receive the
majority of their news from sensationalistic outlets that trend away from the niceties of civil
discourse are less likely to express support for the Supreme Court. This would include
television outlets that would, largely by necessity, still accompany their reports with the
standard positive imagery discussed by Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson (2014). And while the
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subconscious acceptance of positive symbols may indeed influence the attitudes of the less
knowledgeable in their evaluations of the Court, it has been shown that negativity in news
has the longer lasting impact than its positive or neutral counterparts (Soroka and McAdams
2015). Thus, it appears that the relationship between media coverage of the Supreme Court,
through which we must assume Americans are receiving these positive symbols, and public
opinion is one that may be complicated by competing frames.
4.1.2 Framing
It is important to note that one of the most important considerations of framing is
that is runs counter to the notion of people being purely rational actors. In other words, a
rational actor would likely have something in mind that could not be shaken simply by a new
or different perspective, and yet, framing effects show time and again that attitudes must not
be as stable as many think if they can be rattled by alternate frames (Druckman 2004).
Looking to the literature on competing frames, Americans are not always receiving the same
information about a topic at any given time (Chong and Druckman 2007; Sniderman and
Theriault 2004).
Chong and Druckman (2007) argue that frames, particularly in the context of media
presentation, take two specific forms equivalence and emphasis frames. Equivalence frames
provide identical information, just phrased in different ways. Kahneman and Tversky (1981)
show how equivalence frames can significantly affect how people perceive of a certain
prompt or situation. For example, treatment groups were given two options that were
entirely identical in terms of outcome, and yet groups would dramatically prefer one over the
other. One program may offer that statement that of 600 people, 200 people will be saved
from some dramatic situation. The second would say there’s a 1/3 probably that no one will
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be saved and a 2/3 probability that no one will be saved. Although they operate almost
identically, the semantics of the prompt influenced far more people to pick that first option.
. Regarding emphasis frames, the information provided in different stimuli are
indeed emphasizing different things. One example includes the news coverage of a Ku Klux
Klan rally, and whether the individual gives greater psychological deference to a frame
discussing the rally as a public safety issue as opposed to a free speech issue (Chong and
Druckman 2007). The preference for a particular frame depends on a number of factors,
including the strength of the frame and the motivation of the individual. This also falls in
line with the idea of positive vs. negative frames. Again, both participants will receive
information on the same topic, but in dramatically different ways. Of course, the Supreme
Court is not immune to framing differences in media coverage. In one study of the topic,
Clawson and Waltenburg (2003) found that coverage of a major affirmative action decision
was markedly different between the traditional mainstream press and those that tend that
target black audiences. And in a study closer to this one, Baird and Gangl (2006) find that
when the media focus on the political operations of the Court, reactions are considerably
more sour than when the frame is that of the Court’s unwavering commitment to legal
guidelines.
For the purposes of this research, we are more interested in this category of framing.
In the scenario of Supreme Court reporting, I suggest that the positive symbolism discussed
by Gibson et al. (2014) can be paired against politicized coverage, providing a cognitive
competition. Is the instantaneous response associated with motivated reasoning a more
powerful association than the politicized nature of a given story?
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4.2 A Theory of Positive Symbolism Versus Politicization
As discussed, the primary argument posed by Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson (2014)
in positivity theory is that positive symbols of the Supreme Court, supposedly absorbed by
individuals throughout their lifetimes, are partially responsible for the Court’s relatively high
levels of support. Even when faced with an action from the Court that is unfavorable to the
individual, these collected exposures to positive symbols will for many be enough to
persuade acquiescence to the Court and its actions. However, there are a number of reasons
to further analyze this argument. In their design, the authors utilize positive symbols against
neutral, abstract imagery, as a way to show how the positive symbols had greater impact on
the respondent than did the alternative. The respondents receive a prompt based on
something they find important. Therefore, the vast majority of subjects had some kind of
passionate response to the chosen issue. While this is by all means a novel approach, it is not
really a change of frames, as I propose to accomplish here. The goal to see if positive
symbolism can temper their preconceived notions of an issue important to them, not
whether the framing of the issue competes with their symbology.
Alternatively, it could be that competing emphasis frames – those on the same topic,
but presented with different matters of import – could be more influential than what
positive symbolism is able to overcome. Considering the mass proliferation of the news
media in the last two decades, individuals are able to choose their preferred media outlets
based on any number of criteria, such as purported accuracy or ideology. Iyengar and Hahn
(2009) make the argument the latter, ideological selectivity, leads consumers with ideological
preferences toward like-minded media outlets. Considering the popularity of cable news
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channels like Fox News or MSNBC, or even within the realm of newspapers like the
Washington Post and the Washington Times, Americans have greater choice than ever. Add
in the internet and social media, which usually fail to be fact-checked, and Americans have a
plurality of options that range anywhere from far left, neo-Marxist material to publications
disseminated by the “Alt-Right.”
As Hitt and Searles (2018) find in a study on media coverage and public support of
the Supreme Court, they find that the way the coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court has been
covered over time has changed to a more “game-framed” narrative, as opposed to more
principled coverage. Importantly, as this kind of coverage has changed, so have public
attitudes toward the Court. In particular, as this shift increases, public support for the
institution drops. So, while not all media cover the Court in this fashion, and television is
more likely to do so than other media, this kind of difference in framing appears to have
significant effects how the public views the Court.
In the context of this discussion, these choices matter. The framing of issues, as
discussed earlier, can lead to dramatically different evaluations. When discussing something
like institutional or specific support of the U.S. Court, just like any other political actor, its
activities can be framed in ways that nearly run counter to each other. Assuming Gibson,
Lodge and Woodson (2014) are correct, there is a great likelihood that at least some
coverage, particularly via television, newspapers, the internet, and social media, is
accompanied by the very positive symbolism. While the collected, subconscious association
of the Court via these images may indeed exist, and we see support for their effects in a
particular setting, we do not see this theory subjected to competing emphasis frames.
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It is possible that positivity theory, and the total weight given to positive symbolism,
is indeed a remarkably important element in opinions toward the Court and the nominee
after exposure to news stories. As stated, I propose that all respondents be given the same
issue, and the framing of that issue be elemental to understanding how well positive
symbolism affects support for the Court in the aftermath of reading either highly politicized
articles that thrust the Court into the center of political controversy, versus those that merely
present the basic facts of the same decision. Within a 2x2 framework that uses two different
frames , neutral and politicized, and the use or absence of symbolic imagery, I propose a
number of hypotheses regarding how I believe these elements operate and interact in
relation to Court support. First, I argue that the element of positive symbolism may be
enough to increase both specific and diffuse support, regardless of the article frame, in
comparison to those who received no image whatsoever.
H1: Respondents receiving a neutral frame and positive symbolism will show less specific and
institutional support than those receiving a neutral frame and no symbolism. .
H2: Respondents receiving a high politicization frame and positive symbolism will shoe less specific
and institutional support than those receiving a high politicization frame and no symbolism.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the presence of a positive symbol cannot
singularly outweigh the critical nature of a news frame. If individuals are more likely to latch
on to negativity over positivity (Soroka and McAdams 2014), the presence of a positive
symbol could make little difference when paired against a highly politicized frame. More
importantly, it is likely that those who receive both a positive image and neutral frame will
give more supportive evaluations than those given a positive image and a more politicized
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frame. Finally, those who receive no image and receive a politicized frame are likely to be
less supportive than any other treatment group. Thus:
H3: Respondents receiving a high politicization frame and positive symbolism will show less specific
and institutional support than those receiving a low politicization frame and positive symbolism.
H4: Respondents receiving a high politicization frame and no image will show less specific and
institutional support than those receiving a low politicization frame and no positive symbolism.
As this is a study largely centered around the potential impact of the media and its
presentation of Supreme Court content, it is important to consider how some other mediacentric factors may influence perceptions of Court support. In line with work from Bartels
and Johnston (2012), there is strong evidence regarding media choice’s ability to influence
consumers’ perceptions of political institutions. They find that individuals who consume
media from non-traditional sources, which they call “sensational” sources, are less
supportive of political institutions. The brashness and lack of civility found in many outlet
types such as cable news and talk radio may impact how individuals feel about all branches
of government, including the Supreme Court.
H5: Respondents who receive most of their news from sensational sources will show less specific and
institutional support than those who prefer traditional sources.
Additionally, in line with much prior research on the topic from Gibson and others,
I take into consideration a few elements of knowledge. First, in connection with media as
well, I consider how much news media the respondent consumes on average in a given
week. We should expect that those that consume more news information are likely more
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exposed to information about the Supreme Court. In accordance the positivity bias
argument that “to know the Court is to love the Court” (Gibson and Caldeira 2009), I also
expect those that show greater specific knowledge of the Court and its activities will show
greater support for the Court.
H6: Respondents who consume more news will show greater specific and institutional support.
H7: Respondents who show greater knowledge about the Court will show greater specific and
institutional support.
The following sections detail the data collection process, the variables, and how I
intend to address these hypotheses.
4.3 Data and Methods
I utilize a unique online survey experiment with 354 total participants to look at the
impact of politicized language and positive symbolism. The survey was conducted through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, or “mTurk,” which uses a pool of workers that may opt into
surveys for monetary compensation. This has become a popular way to collect data in the
social sciences for the last decade for several reasons. While there are some criticisms of
mTurk, particularly the quality of the data being collected in recent years (Chmielewski and
Kucker 2020), there are also a great many benefits. Not only does mTurk provide a fairly
diverse sample for a relatively low cost to the researcher, there is evidence that mTurk
workers are more attentive than those in more traditional subject pools (Hauser and Schwarz
2016), tend to share views similar to those of the mass public (Clifford, Jewell and Waggoner
2015), and may actually be more thoughtful participants in their answers than similar student
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based pools (Anson 2018). Thus, it is a very useful tool for social science research with
seemingly adequate external validity for the purposes of this study.
Taking into account some of the issues presented in recent years, I took some
precautions in respondent selection. In order to collect as best a sample as possible under
the circumstances, several qualifications were required for participation in the survey. First,
respondents must be living in the United States. Secondly, per statistics collected by mTurk,
the number of surveys, or HITS, completed by the respondent must be greater than 1,000.
Finally, their HIT approval rate must be greater than 95%. By enacting these qualifications, I
was able to move forward with some confidence that the participants were not only qualified
to take the survey, but also that they had a substantive record of positive evaluations from
those conducting research with them.
For the purposes of this study, the use of a survey experiment through mTurk had
strong benefits. While more traditional “lab” experiments are valued for their internal
validity, allowing the researcher to better address the idea of causality in relation to a given
stimulus, they lack much external validity due to their relatively low sample size that often
fails to address a larger population. Alternatively, many surveys are valued for their external
validity through the use of large, more representative samples. However, these are limited in
their ability to address causality. Thus, a survey experiment is able to somewhat bridge the
gap between the two by utilizing a larger sample pool and treating them to some kind of
randomly assigned stimulus, though there are admittedly potential problems with addressing
news content through such a method (Barabas and Jerrit 2010).
4.3.1 The Sample
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First, to address the sample, just looking at some of the demographic characteristics
of the respondents, we can see there is significant diversity. Of the 354 respondents, a little
more than 53% identified as male, and around 47% as female. Around 77% of respondents
identified as white, 14% identified as black or African American, 6% as Asian, and a little
less than 1% as American Indian or Alaska Native. An additional 22% identified as Hispanic
or Latino. So, we can see that while the sample is slightly skewed toward whites, there is a
strong amount of racial and ethnic diversity in the sample. The sample does skew toward a
more educated crowd than the general American population. Around 6% finished at the
high school level, 16% attended some college, 54% have a college degree, 8% attended some
graduate study, and 16% have a graduate or professional degree. Finally, and importantly, we
see strong variance in the age groups of the participants. 16% were less than 25, 39% were
between 25 and 35, 27% between 36 and 45, 12% between 46 and 55, and around 6%
indicated they were above the age of 55. While the higher end of these age groups is not as
well represented in the study, that was to be somewhat expected.
Variation can also be observed in their political preferences. There is a nice split
between the ideological positions of the participants. 43% identified as conservative and
43% liberal. Breaking that down further into the extremity of their ideologies, 10%
considered themselves to be extremely liberal and 14% extremely conservative. Interestingly,
party identification did not mirror the ideological balance. 53% of the respondents identify
as Democrats and 29% as Republicans, with those calling themselves Independents or
something else making up 18% of the sample. Nevertheless, this appears to demonstrate the
sample is diverse in makeup and is not radically divergent from that of the U.S. population.
4.3.2 The Survey Experiment
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Regarding the experimental design, the survey required participants to answer a
series of questions about their personal characteristics, political preferences, and attitudes
toward various American institutional actors. Most importantly for this study, the 344
participants were randomly assigned to five separate groups for a survey experiment
regarding positive symbolism, politicized language, and their effects on attitudes toward the
U.S. Supreme Court. Table 4.1 provides the basis for the 2x2 design. Each of the groups was
assigned one of two articles written by me about the case of Rucho v. Common Cause, a 2019
Supreme Court case that ended with the conservative wing of the Court determining that
political gerrymandering cases are political questions and not reviewable by the courts. All
articles can be found in the appendix. The politicized article emphasized ideology, partisan
politics, and potential negative consequences of the decisions proposed in a dissent. The
more neutral article made no mention of ideology, the actors involved, or any mention of
problems that may arise. Finally, a control article was written that had nothing to do with a
decision, instead focusing on upcoming renovation to the Supreme Court building.
One group was assigned the article that was high in politicized language,
accompanied by a symbolic image, the U.S. Supreme Court itself as per Gibson, Lodge and
Woodson (2014). A second was assigned the same politicized article without the symbolic
image. The third received the more neutral article accompanied by the symbolic image. The
fourth received the same neutral article without the image. The fifth received the control
story without image.
Table 4.1 Politicization and Positive Imagery
1. High politicization/No Image

2. High Politicization/Image

3. Low Politicization/No Image

4. Low Politicization/Image
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Following the treatment, respondents were then given a series of questions. First, I
asked about their perceptions of the language used in the respective articles as a
manipulation check. Of those who received the politicized article, 72% said it contained
politicized language compared to 59% who did not receive that article. This suggests at least
some validity regarding the tones of the articles. Then respondents were asked questions
about their support for Supreme Court decisions and their support for the institution itself.
4.3.3 Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variables deal with Court support, both specific and diffuse,
treated as continuous variables, compatible with use of ordinary least squares regression
analysis. These measurements are based on several questions regarding support for the
Supreme Court’s decisions and their attitudes toward the Court in general. These responses
were then transformed into additive indices representing Legitimacy and Specific support.
I consider diffuse support, or what I will call legitimacy, as defined by Easton (1965):
“A reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate
outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their
wants” (273). This is a matter of understanding whether or not the American public will
accept or acquiesce to a Court that may in fact be ruling in ways that run counter to their
own preferences. After recoding the responses for the index, the Legitimacy measure ranges
from 0-12, with 12 being the most supportive of the Court and most likely to believe in their
legitimacy. The mean of the Legitimacy measure is 7.10 with a standard deviation of 3.12. 28
of the 353 respondents (7.93%) showed maximum support for the institution, while 11 of
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the 353 respondents (3.12%) who answered the survey reached the, indicated a total lack of
belief in the Supreme Court’s legitimacy.
In keeping with the literature’s understanding of specific support, my
conceptualization of specific support is “a set of attitudes toward an institution based upon
the fulfillment of demands for particular policies or actions” (Caldeira and Gibson 1992).
Again, utilizing a series of questions that fall in line with traditional measurements of specific
support, I construct another continuous variable in the form of an additive index.
Participants could again choose among the options of strongly disagree; disagree; neither
agree nor disagree; agree; and strongly agree. After compiling and recoding the responses,
the additive index ranged from 0-10, with 0 indicating the lowest level of specific support
and 10 indicating the highest level of specific support. This index yielded a mean response of
6.45 and a standard deviation of 2.50. Similar to that of the diffuse support index, 9.04% of
respondents expressed maximum levels of specific support, while only 3.67% indicated a
complete lack of specific support.
4.3.4 Independent Variables
The primary independent variable is the treatment group of the respondent. As
stated above, if positivity theory holds true, those respondents who received a symbolic
image along with the article should show comparatively greater levels of support for the
Court, with those receiving the more neutral article being even more positive toward the
Court and its decisions than those who received the politicized article. Alternatively, those
who receive a politicized article without the symbolic image should show greater levels of
animosity toward the Court. This variable is treated as categorical, with the control group
serving as the baseline category.
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I am also interested in the political preferences of the respondents. First, a threecategory ideology variable is employed, with 1 representing those who identified as liberal, 2
as those who claimed to be independent or middle of the road, and 3 for those who
identified as conservative. Similarly, a party identification variable is included, separated into
Democrats (1), Independents (2), and Republicans (3). For both variables, the second
category will serve as the baseline category in the model. I have also included a measure of
where the respondent believes the Court stands ideologically.
I also take into consideration where the individuals receive their information from
and how much of it they consume. Data was collected on where respondents claim to get
most of their information from, whether it be traditional outlets like newspapers or network
news, or other less traditional places like Facebook, talk radio, or cable news. As mentioned
earlier, Bartels and Johnston (2012) argue that individuals who receive their information
from more “sensational” outlets, like cable and talk radio, tend to be less supportive of
political institutions. Based on this, I’ve created a dichotomous variable based on whether or
not the respondent prefers their news from more sensational outlets, including social media
and podcasts, a consideration admittedly not made in Bartels and Johnston’s work. 60% of
respondents in the survey said they got most of their news from a designated sensational
source, with 35% claiming they get most of their news from social media, the highest
percentage of any media type.
Another media aspect is the amount of news consumed. While the measures used do
not specifically ask about how much news they receive about the Supreme Court, the long
held argument of Gibson and others (see Gibson and Caldeira 2009) is that knowledge of
the Court is primary factor in its support. So, while it cannot be guaranteed that these
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individuals are receiving much news about the Court, considering it is not a well-covered
institution, people who consume more news will likely know more about it. The survey
included questions about where the respondent received most of their information from:
newspapers; social media; cable news; online newsmagazines; talk radio; more traditional
news radio; or podcasts. In the analysis provided, social media serves as the baseline. I
additionally use a 3-question, correct/incorrect index of Supreme Court knowledge, asking
respondents to identify the Chief Justice from a list of options, how long justices serve, and
how many votes it traditionally takes for the Court to grant certiorari for a petition. The
measure ranges from 0-3, depending on how many questions are answered correctly. This
measure yielded a mean of 1.92, with nearly 27% receiving perfect scores.
I also take into consideration the nature of the MTurk process and the possibility
that respondents may simply be clicking through without paying attention to the questions
being asked. Most importantly, I was concerned with whether or not the respondents had
correctly identified whether or not they received an image, and whether or not they could
correctly identify what the image was that accompanied the article. While by no means
perfect, 74% of respondents were able to correctly identify whether or not they received an
image and what the image was if they did receive one. This provides some confidence for
our analyses and is included as a control in the analysis. The three models provided in both
Table 4.2 and 4.3 use two different assessments as to whether respondents took enough time
(5 seconds) to read the prompt, or if they did not. The first, labeled “Good Control,”
includes a dummy variable for those who took enough time (1) and those who did not (0).
The second model only includes those who took enough time. The third includes everyone,
without a control.
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Finally, I include a number of basic demographic variables that may influence
support for the Court. Lastly, I include a variable for education level treated as continuous,
from high school education to graduate or professional degree.
4.4 Results
Table 4.2 Legitimacy by Frame (Continued on next page)
VARIABLES
Good Control
Only Good
Politicized w/ Image

0.20
(0.49)
0.76
(0.52)
0.65
(0.50)
-0.32
(0.53)
-0.13
(0.12)
-1.80***
(0.47)
-1.45*
(0.87)
0.01
(0.52)
1.76**
(0.54)
2.16**
(0.60)
1.13
(1.22)
1.87
(1.17)
1.50
(1.13)
-0.17
(0.15)
0.32
(0.38)
0.71
(0.47)
0.38
(0.42)
-1.22*

Politicized w/o Image
Neutral w/ Image
Neutral w/o Image
Perceived Court Ideology
Sensational Media Preference
Prefer Newspapers
Prefer Online Newsmagazine
Prefer Online News
Prefer Cable News
Prefer Talk Radio
Prefer Traditional Radio
Prefer Podcasts
Education
White
Independent
Republican
Liberal
99

0.43
(0.68)
1.44*
(0.73)
0.67
(0.67)
-0.30
(0.71)
-0.10
(0.16)
-1.68**
(0.65)
-1.87
(1.14)
-0.01
(0.70)
1.39*
(0.79)
1.73**
(0.79)
0.87
(1.78)
2.91*
(1.58)
1.82
(2.18)
-0.24
(0.20)
-0.32
(0.50)
0.35
(0.69)
0.20
(0.55)
-1.86**

All
0.17
(0.49)
0.74
(0.52)
0.66
(0.51)
-0.31
(0.53)
-0.13
(0.12)
-1.80***
(0.47)
-1.43
(0.88)
0.03
(0.53)
1.74***
(0.54)
2.18***
(0.60)
1.10
(1.23)
1.86
(1.17)
1.47
(1.35)
-0.17
(0.15)
0.30
(0.38)
0.64
(0.47)
0.34
(0.43)
-1.21**

(Table 4.2 Continued)
Conservative
Knowledge of Court
Image Wrong
Brief Viewer
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(0.52)
-1.47**
(0.55)
0.48*
(0.19)
0.85**
(0.39)
0.42
(0.32)
7.46***
(1.09)

(0.76)
-2.21***
(0.80)
0.47*
(0.28)
1.28**

(0.53)
-1.42**
(0.55)
0.51**
(0.20)
0.84**

(0.55)
8.72***
(1.56)

(0.39)
7.67***
(1.08)

353
0.19

205
0.24

353
0.19

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.2 provides the results of OLS regressions on our first dependent key
dependent variable diffuse support, or legitimacy. There is minimal support for the
hypotheses proposed regarding the tempering effect of politicized language on the impact of
positive symbolism. With the control group (no image, no politicized language) operating as
the baseline, the results are somewhat surprising. Those who received the more politicized
article without any accompanying imagery tended to give the Court higher legitimacy
evaluations. Alternatively, those who received a neutral language treatment with an image
also displayed comparatively higher legitimacy evaluations than the control group. These
would appear to be conflicting results to a certain degree. A politicized article without an
image should theoretically yield the least broad support for the institution. The finding of a
neutral article with an image is in line with expectations of positivity theory, as the image
could be triggering deep-harbored support, while the tone of the article itself does not
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complicate that psychological connection. When rotating the base category, I find no
statistical difference among the treatments.
There are, however, some other interesting findings that support prior work in the
literature on Supreme Court legitimacy. I do find, in line with work from Bartels and
Johnston (2012), that a preference for sensationalistic media results in lower legitimacy
evaluations. This again ties into the idea of sensational media’s preference for coverage that
is often critical of political institutions. I also find it somewhat interesting that in comparison
with those respondents who found themselves to be moderates ideologically, both liberals
and conservatives were less supportive of the Court’s legitimacy. While it is unclear as to
why this would be, it does not appear to be connected to their perceptions of the Court’s
ideology. When including an interactive term between the respondent’s ideology and their
perception of the Court’s ideological leaning, no significant relationship unfolds. I also find
support for the idea of Court knowledge bolstering legitimacy for the institution, as those
who scored higher on objective Supreme Court knowledge questions were significantly more
likely to ascribe greater legitimacy to the institution.
Turning to specific support in Table 4.3, I find no significant relationship between
any of the treatments and this type of support for the institution with the control category as
the baseline. There are however some significant relationships to be found elsewhere.
Table 4.3 Specific Support by Frame (Continued on next page)
VARIABLES

(2)
Good Control

(3)
Only Good

(4)
All

-0.54
(0.36)
-0.41
(0.49)
0.49

-0.22
(0.54)
-0.60
(0.50)
0.57

-0.54
(0.38)
-0.40
(0.37)
0.51

Politicized w/ Image
Politicized w/o Image
Neutral w/Image
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(Table 4.3 Continued)
Neutral w/o Image
Perceived Court Ideology
Sensational Media Preference
Prefer Newspapers
Prefer Online Newsmagazine
Prefer Online News
Prefer Cable News
Prefer Talk Radio
Prefer Traditional Radio
Prefer Podcasts
Education
White
Independent
Republican
Liberal
Conservative
Knowledge of Court
Image Wrong
Brief Viewer

(0.37)
0.06
(0.39)
-0.12
(0.09)
-0.44
(0.36)
0.63
(0.67)
-1.48*
(0.40)
-0.62
(0.60)
-0.81*
(0.46)
0.70
(0.94)
0.70
(.90)
-2.03*
(1.03)
0.28**
(0.12)
-0.27
(0.29)
-1.84***
(0.37)
-0.12
(0.33)
-0.74*
(0..40)
0.48
(0.42)
-0.38**
(0.15)
-0.30
(0.30)
0.19
(0.24)

(0.51)
0.68
(0.53)
-0.03
(0.12)
-0.21
(0.49)
1.22
(0.86)
-1.02*
(0.53)
-1.83***
(0.60)
-1.22**
(0.59)
-0.75
(1.34)
-0.66
(1.19)
-2.60
(1.64)
0.24
(0.16)
-0.34
(0.38)
-1.78***
(0.52)
-0.09
(0.41)
-0.40
(0.56)
0.60
(0.59)
-0.30
(0.21)
-0.40
(0.42)

(0.38)
0.08
(0.39)
-0.11
(0.09)
-0.44
(0.37)
0.65
(0.68)
-0.47
(0.41)
-0.63
(0.42)
-0.81*
(0.46)
0.69
(0.94)
0.70
(0.90)
-2.05**
(1.04)
0.29**
(0.12)
-0.28
(0.29)
-1.88***
(0.36)
-0.14
(0.33)
-0.73*
(0.40)
0.51
(0.42)
-0.37**
(0.15)
-0.31
(0.30)

7.79***
(0.96)

7.67***
(1.35)

8.00***
(0.95)

354

206

354

Constant
Observations
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R-squared

0.26

0.28

0.26

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Many results from the specific support models differ from that of the legitimacy
model. Here, we do see a relationship between higher education levels and higher levels of
specific support, perhaps suggesting that greater knowledge leads to greater evaluations.
Nevertheless, a perplexing finding regarding the specific Court knowledge measure appears
to complicate some of this story. Also interestingly, when it comes to specific support,
political Independents are least supportive, as are ideological liberals. The latter may hint at
the Court’s recent track record in decisions, though the survey was conducted before the
Dobbs or Bruen decisions were handed down.
Overall, there is little support for the hypotheses proposed regarding either
legitimacy or specific support. While disappointing, there are some possible reasons for this.
Perhaps most importantly, the sample size in this study is relatively small (n=354). Splitting
that sample into five separate treatments, with about 70 respondents per treatment, likely
does not provide the statistical leverage necessary to see a complete understanding as to how
these treatments were received and subsequently how they affected attitudes toward the
Court.
4.5 Discussion
While the results of this study do not necessarily support the hypotheses proposed
statistically, there remains reason to believe that positivity theory in relation to the Supreme
Court is not as universally applicable as its proponents suggest. Positivity theory suggests
that the American public is consistently provided symbolism surrounding Court coverage
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that bolsters the public’s support of the institution. However, this theory never addressed
the idea of whether or not that positive symbolism is accompanied by less positive coverage.
In other words, there may in fact be a positive effect from seeing imagery of the courthouse,
or the scales of justice, or the justices in their robes. But whether or not those positive
symbols can outweigh the effect of critical coverage of the institution is yet to be fully
understood.
In this era of heightened awareness of judicial activity, in which Americans are being
exposed to more information of the nominees and their work than perhaps ever before, it is
critical to understand how the media influence attitudes toward the institution (Peffley,
Denison and Taylor 2020). Americans seem more in tune to the fact that the Court has
ideological factions, and with the Trump administration’s fortune of three nominees and
confirmations to the bench, more Americans seem to recognize what those factions truly
seem to be. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court also seems to recognize this and its members
appear to doing their best to assuage fears that the institution has become just another
politicized branch of government tantamount to the office of the presidency or that of
Congress. In what could be viewed as something of a plea to the public, justices are
increasingly giving interviews and media appearances in an effort to maintain their
institutional legitimacy. Recent work from Strother and Glennon (2021) suggests that these
efforts are beneficial to the members of the Court. By abandoning some of their tradition of
secrecy and appealing to the media and the public at large, the justices of the Supreme Court
may be able to temper some of the negativity associated with their recent decisions,
perceptions of their ideological bias, and feelings of procedural unfairness. Thus, we may be
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entering an era where the Supreme Court becomes more reliant on the media to help bolster
their reputation as opposed to ignoring, or even hiding, from its possible influence.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in 2022 may need to start acknowledging the
media’s role in presentation of their activities in order to maintain authority as a judicial
body. According to Pew Research (2022), public support for the Supreme Court plummeted
16 points between August of 2020 and January of 2022, from a relatively high approval rate
of 70% to a tepid 54%. While this suggests Americans are beginning to recognize the
ideological nature of the Court, against the wishes of the Court itself, this data does not even
take into account recent events that may test the Supreme Court’s ability to wield significant
influence through their opinions. The May, 2022 leak of a major Supreme Court opinion
draft to the online publication ‘Politico’ in the case of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization offered a unprecedented look into the draft process that no doubt piqued the
interest of many judicial scholars. But for the American public, it was a moment of clarity in
understanding how the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court can affect their daily lives,
perhaps in ways they had not before considered. It also presents more evidence as to how
the media’s reporting can muddy the waters in many ways as to what really happens on the
Court, as even the original publisher of the draft, ‘Politico,’ presents its story in a way that
may lead one to believe the draft to be the final word: “Supreme Court has voted to
overturn abortion rights,” their headline reads. And while at the moment of this writing, that
appears to be true, this presentation also may lead individuals to believe the Alito draft on
the Dobbs case is indeed new policy. It, of course, is not.
There should be no doubt that the presentation of Supreme Court news, regardless
of the imagery that accompanies it, is of tremendous import. Even in considering the Dobbs
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opinion, it is worth noting stark contrasts in coverage across the ideological spectrum, and in
particular, what the major issue even is. Many left-leaning publications have focused on the
impact of overturning well-established precedent of nearly 50 years, and the traditional battle
of pro-choice and pro-life advocacy. Alternatively, some right-leaning publications focused
on the leak of the draft itself, as opposed to the content of said draft, and framed that as the
primary problem. These differing frames are providing starkly different information to its
consumers – one focusing on the content of the controversial opinion itself and its potential
implications, the other largely ignoring that to focus on the heretofore unseen nature of the
highly protective Supreme Court failing to keep an unpublished draft from the public eye. It
is hard to believe that either of these frames enhance public opinion of the Supreme Court,
regardless of whether or not a picture of the Supreme Court is included in the story.
Thus, while this research does not disprove positivity theory, current events may hint
at its limitations. This study relied on a relatively small sample, with only around 70
individuals assigned to each treatment. With a larger sample, I believe a statistically
significant relationship could be found between negative coverage and public attitudes,
regardless of positive symbolism. Further, it is quite possible that the stories used for this
experiment are not ideal for this situation. The control story, detailing a renovation of the
Supreme Court itself, could have potentially been more effective if it did not involve the
Supreme Court at all. This would have been better for the manipulation check. There must
be a greater consideration among judicial scholars as to how information about the Supreme
Court, and the courts in general, is presented. As previously noted, the Supreme Court is
becoming more and more of a politicized entity. With this increased politicization comes
increased media coverage of its activities and the actions of its members. Americans are now,
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more than ever, exposed to the process of nomination and confirmation. They are exposed,
perhaps now more than ever, to the internal processes of the institution. And Americans
may even be more exposed to the personal lives of its membership. Considering the
contentious confirmations of the last four nominees of Trump and Biden, respectively,
media coverage of these hearings undoubtedly opened the eyes of many as to how the
confirmation process ultimately works, and how ideology impacts the success or failure of a
nominee. The leak of the Dobbs draft, (and the later reveal that the final opinion would not
depart much), presented accurately by the media, is an interesting peek into how the
Supreme Court operates, and is something that the average American had largely never
considered. And even the discussion of Clarence Thomas’s personal life in 2022, between
the revelation that his wife was in contact with President Trump’s Chief of Staff during the
January 6th incident at the capitol and his mysterious illness during said revelation, is
somewhat new in terms of information typically provided about the Court’s membership. If
Gibson’s proclamation “to know the Court is to love the Court” holds any weight, this
would be an ideal time to test that hypothesis once more. Americans are being inundated
with coverage of Court activities, and if recent polling is any indication, the response has not
been a positive one for the institution.
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CHAPTER 5 Concluding Thoughts on Media Language Use and the Supreme Court
The relationship between the Court and the media is a complicated one. The
institution tends to avoid direct interactions with the media. Their proceedings are secretive
and their desire to talk about their decisions or decision making is minimal. Meanwhile, the
media often has a difficult time in covering the Court. Many reporters are not legal experts,
much law is esoteric, and the ability to provide meaningful imagery from deliberations
currently is not available to them. The most interactive most justices will be in a media laden
environment comes during the nomination period, and even coverage is subject to scrutiny.
Of the three branches of government, it is reasonable to suggest it is the most difficult to
cover. A better understanding of how this coverage works, and whether different outlets
approach Court coverage differently, provides potential concern for the effectiveness of
Court and the Rule of Law.
5.1 Implications of This Work
While findings were mixed throughout, there are some key takeaways from this
project. First, it is important to continue moving forward studies of the Supreme Court’s
treatment in the news media, particularly as the media environment continues to expand and
the workload and nominations of the justices receive ever increasing scrutiny among the
media, and consequently, the American public. Chapter 2 provides some evidence that
disagreeability with ideological Supreme Court decisions may impact the way ideological
news outlets cover the decisions, particularly among conservative outlets disagreeing with
liberal decisions. While the data utilized in Chapter 2 is by no means archaic, coming from
the 2015 term, more can be done to understand how coverage has changed over time. Since
the 2015 term, we have had a number of controversial decisions handed down by the Court
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that allow for disparate coverage among media outlets. Perhaps most notably as of late are
the decisions to largely overturn the Roe precedent and to expand firearm protections
beyond those established in Heller in 2010. These topics divide the nation sharply, and with a
now decidedly conservative 6-3 Court, there may be dramatic shifts in terms of language
selection in coverage among ideological outlets.
It is not just the decisions themselves that may receive disparate coverage.
Considering the contentious battles over nominations under the Trump administration,
further work into understanding how the media are covering judicial activities is paramount
to understanding why the Court’s popularity is waning. As Chapter 3 explains in detail, the
Kavanaugh nominations serves as something of a microcosm of things to come. While
certainly unique in terms of the complaints against the now-sitting justice, these hearings
continue to become more polarized. Not to be outdone by the ire from Senate Democrats in
confirmation hearings for Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, Republicans recently fired back
against President Biden’s nomination of Kentaji Brown Jackson, including suggesting that
she had a soft spot for pedophiles as a lower court judge (Min Kim, Davis, and Kane 2022).
This trend seems to have no end in sight as polarization continues to rise. Thus, the news
outlets that tend to cater ideologically to the American public may indeed be pushing people
further from supporting the actions surrounding the U.S. Supreme Court. The justices
selected seem to have become more of a representative for the party of the president that
selected them.
To this last point, the decision to take on such an ideological agenda and overturn
longstanding and generally supported precedent like Roe may be very problematic for the
institution itself. If you consider justices to sometimes be strategic actors, as suggested by
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Epstein and Knight (1997) and many others, they have to take into consideration the
reactions of other actors, which may include the media and public. If the American public
reacts to the coverage they see in a negative light, the authority of the Court may begin to
wane. As Chapter 4 details, the Supreme Court supposedly has maintained its legitimacy
because of the positive symbolism that surrounds the institution. While the survey
experiment did not yield significant results, nevertheless, it stands to reason that as the Court
trends further one ideological direction, ideological outlets on the other end of the spectrum
may be inclined to use more politicized or negative language in their coverage. Again, this
may not bode well for the legitimacy of the Court and may affect their ability to maintain
influence in the future.
The circle of influence shared by the Court, media, and public cannot be understated
in its importance. Yes, the Supreme Court issues the decisions, and they use their own
distinct rhetoric in crafting these opinions. The greater American public is unlikely to sit
down and read the opinion, even if it something they care about, simply because of the way
these opinions are written. Thus, the public relies on the media to interpret much of what
happened. Depending on how the media present a decision, or a nomination for that matter,
the American public may get vastly different stories about the same event. A victory for one
side is a defeat for the other, and ideological outlets may exploit this. The public consumes
the coverage and they evaluate the decisions based on the language used. Coming full circle,
the American public evaluates the Court itself. If their evaluations of its performance, seen
the lens of their preferred information provider, declines, then so does the power of the
Court itself. In other words, the Court is relying on public support than may be heavily
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influenced by the media that covers their actions. This makes projects like this one even
more important moving forward with a very divided Court.
5.2 Future Avenues for Research
While scholars continue to look into media influence, and more specifically media
influence on the Court, there are still many avenues for research in the area. In particular,
there are constant advancements in rhetoric studies and different ways to measure some of
the latent constructs attempted throughout this work. Beyond the language itself, it would
interesting to see whether vocal tone impacted the way coverage was presented. As an
example from Chapter 3, Justice Kavanaugh’s hearing regarding the Blasey Ford accusations
produced a very loud defense. Arguably, you could make the case that it sounded unhinged
at times, particularly as she shouted, “I like beer!” On the other hand, an outlet more
sympathetic to the conservative cause may take his vocal tone as a passionate defense on
behalf of his own integrity. The same could be said of justices on the bench and their vocal
qualities, their tendency to interrupt, etc. Would Scalia cutting off a fellow justice, or even an
attorney as most justices do from time to time, be portrayed as rude or simply direct. It
would valuable to understanding more on how the personalities of these individuals come
into play when presented in media.
I also believe greater scrutiny should be paid to “positivity theory” as an explanation
of diffuse support of the institution. When considering positive symbols for the survey
experiment in Chapter 4, I selected a benign image of the U.S. Supreme Court with the
respondent either receiving that image or not. It would likely be more beneficial to provide a
counter-frame image, like a protest in front of the Courthouse. Additionally, I do not think
the article I wrote for the politized condition went far enough. In the future, I would use
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coverage from traditional sources against more eccentric websites, particularly because the
internet is becoming the dominant force in news coverage. Those promoting positivity
theory do not take into account how diverse the media landscape is. Finally, as the Supreme
Court’s support has fallen dramatically since the earliest publications on positivity theory, a
new dive into that area is warranted.
Finally, if one were to ideally look into how ideologically disparate outlets may
influence coverage, a look into actual television and talk radio coverage would be
worthwhile. The stories featured through this project come from the websites of news
outlets. The coverage seen on these sites may be dramatically different than what a television
viewer is receiving in terms of coverage. In particular, regardless of whether it is considered
hard news or not, many Americans receive their information from talking head punditry
shows. Exposure to the incivility discussed earlier that often happens on these shows would
likely show a far greater effect in terms of language divergence.
5.3 Final Thoughts on Media and the Supreme Court
Without the news media, the “average American” would know very little about the
Supreme Court. Even with the news media, the average American knows little about the
Supreme Court. However, what little they do know comes from the faucet of the press.
Without a reasonable understanding as to how these relationships operate amongst one
another, we miss a key part of the puzzle as to how effective the Court can truly be. If taken
at face value as an authoritative but just institution, it’s likely that many Americans would
indeed acquiesce to it. If challenged in the press as a partisan and deceitful branch, it divides
support for it across the country.
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The media plays the “middle man” in this relationship. Just like when playing
telephone game, some things may be lost in translation, manipulated, or simply ignored as it
passes down the line. Since the Court is reticent to step into the spotlight to further explain
their decisions, it allows of bevvy of secondary actors to potential manipulate what they
wrote. Through a better understanding of the language chosen by those reporting on the
Court, we can better understand public attitudes toward the Court.
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APPENDIX 1: Chapter 2 and 3 Politicized Words Dictionary
The list of politicized terms included in this analysis are intended to represent a
presentation of the Supreme Court as a political, rather than legal actor. This means
politicized language regarding the Court focuses on the ideological coalitions, disagreement
and dissent and other political actors. The full list is provided below:
Biden, Bush, Carson, Challenged, Challengers, Christie, Clinton, Coalition, Congress,
Congressional, Congressman, Congresswoman, Conservative, Conservative Wing,
Contested, Controversial, Criticism, Criticized, Cruz, Democrat, Democratic, Democratic
Party, Denounced, Dissent, Dissented, Fiorina, Fought, Gilmore, Governor, Graham,
House Member, Huckabee, Interest Group, Jindal, Kasich, Left Wing, Liberal, Liberal Wing,
Median Justice, Obama, Pataki, Praised, President Obama, Presidential, Rallied, Rand,
Republican, Republican Party, Right Wing, Rubio, Sanders, Santorum, Senate, Senator,
Swing Vote, Swing Voter, Trump, Walker.
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APPENDIX 2: Chapter 3 Latent Legalistic Dictionary
List of legalistic words (Johnson and Socker 2012):
admissible affidavit, amicus curiae, amicus, amici, appellant, arraignment, bail, bench trial,
brief, burden of proof, case load, case file, case law, cause of action, chambers, class action,
clerk, damages, de facto, de jure, de novo, discharge, discovery, dismissal, due process, en
banc, exculpatory, ex parte, felony, habeus corpus, hearsay, high bench, high court,
injunction, in camera, inculpatory, jurisdiction, jurisprudence, marble temple, moot, motion,
original intent, original meaning, per curiam, peremptory, precedent, probation, pro tem, pro
se, remand, robes, statute, strict scrutiny, subpoena, tort, venue, warrant, writ.
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APPENDIX 3: Chapter 3 Modeling Reference Rotations
Coverage Tone in Time Period 1: Liberal Reference
Variables

Politicized

Negative

Legal

Neutral Outlet

-0.0029***
(0.0009)
-0.0020**
(0.0009)
-0.0002***
(0.0001)
0.0000**
(0.0000)
0.0020**
(0.0008)
-0.0018*
(0.0010)
-0.0000***
(0.0000)
0.0143***
(0.0008)

0.0005
(0.0009)
-0.0000
(0.0008)
0.0001*
(0.0001)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0009
(0.0008)
0.0035***
(0.0009)
0.0000***
(0.0000)
0.0092***
(0.0008)

0.0002
(0.0003)
0.0006**
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0007***
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0003)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0014***
(0.0002)

Conservative Outlet
Date
Date Squared
Sensational
Opinion
Tokens
Constant
Observations
R-squared

666
666
666
0.0646
0.0506
0.0359
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Coverage Tone in Time Period 1: Conservative Reference (Continues on next page)
Variables

Politicized

Negative

Legal

Liberal Outlet

0.0020**
(0.0009)
-0.0009
(0.0009)
-0.0002***
(0.0001)
0.0000**
(0.0000)

0.0000
(0.0008)
0.0005
(0.0008)
0.0001*
(0.0001)
-0.0000
(0.0000)

-0.0006**
(0.0002)
-0.0004
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0000
(0.0000)

0.0020**
(0.0008)
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0.0009
(0.0008)

-0.0007***
(0.0002)

Neutral Outlet
Date
Date Squared
(Coverage Tone in Time
Period 1 Continued)
Sensational

Opinion

-0.0018*
(0.0010)
-0.0000***
(0.0000)
0.0123***
(0.0009)

Tokens
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.0035***
(0.0009)
0.0000***
(0.0000)
0.0092***
(0.0008)

0.0000
(0.0003)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0020***
(0.0002)

666
666
666
0.0646
0.0506
0.0359
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Coverage Tone in Time Period 2: Liberal Reference
Variables

Politicized

Negative

Legal

Neutral Outlet

-0.0013
(0.0014)
-0.0002
(0.0014)
-0.0087
(0.0078)
0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0009
(0.0013)
-0.0035**
(0.0014)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
0.2883
(0.2409)

-0.0016
(0.0016)
0.0024
(0.0016)
0.0060
(0.0088)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0009
(0.0015)
0.0022
(0.0016)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.1602
(0.2725)

0.0005
(0.0006)
-0.0000
(0.0006)
0.0103***
(0.0032)
-0.0001***
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0005)
-0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.3144***
(0.1001)

Conservative Outlet
Date
Date Squared
Sensational
Opinion
Tokens
Constant

Observations
147
147
147
R-squared
0.0760
0.0965
0.0804
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coverage Tone in Time Period 2: Conservative Reference (Continues on next page)
Variables

Politicized
117

Negative

Legal

Liberal Outlet
Neutral Outlet
Date
Date Squared
Sensational
Opinion
Tokens
Constant

0.0002
(0.0014)
-0.0011
(0.0014)
-0.0087
(0.0078)
0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0009
(0.0013)
-0.0035**
(0.0014)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
0.2881
(0.2407)

-0.0024
(0.0016)
-0.0040**
(0.0016)
0.0060
(0.0088)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0009
(0.0015)
0.0022
(0.0016)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.1577
(0.2722)

0.0000
(0.0006)
0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0103***
(0.0032)
-0.0001***
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0005)
-0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.3145***
(0.1000)

Observations
147
147
147
R-squared
0.0760
0.0965
0.0804
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coverage Tone in Time Period 3: Liberal Reference
Variables

Politicized

Negative

Legal

Neutral Outlet

-0.0006
(0.0008)
-0.0012
(0.0008)
-0.0001
(0.0016)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0002
(0.0008)
-0.0025***
(0.0009)
-0.0000*
(0.0000)
0.0109
(0.0646)

0.0010
(0.0010)
0.0019**
(0.0010)
0.0028
(0.0020)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0013
(0.0010)
0.0073***
(0.0011)
0.0000***
(0.0000)
-0.1034
(0.0816)

0.0000
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0004)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
-0.0005*
(0.0002)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0002
(0.0177)

Conservative Outlet
Date
Date Squared
Sensational
Opinion
Tokens
Constant
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(Coverage Tone in Time
Period Three Continued)
Observations
510
510
510
R-squared
0.0272
0.1046
0.0127
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coverage Tone in Time Period 3: Conservative Reference
VARIABLES

Politicized

Negative

Legal

Liberal Outlet

0.0012
(0.0008)
0.0007
(0.0009)
-0.0001
(0.0016)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0002
(0.0008)
-0.0025***
(0.0009)
-0.0000*
(0.0000)
0.0097
(0.0646)

-0.0019**
(0.0010)
-0.0009
(0.0011)
0.0028
(0.0020)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0013
(0.0010)
0.0073***
(0.0011)
0.0000***
(0.0000)
-0.1015
(0.0817)

0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0004)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
-0.0005*
(0.0002)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0003
(0.0177)

Neutral Outlet
Date
Date Squared
Sensational
Opinion
Tokens
Constant

Observations
510
510
510
R-squared
0.0272
0.1046
0.0127
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 4: Survey Experiment Materials
Symbolic Image:

1 - Politicized Story:
Supreme Court Conservatives Rule Partisan Gerrymandering a Political Question
On Friday, a deeply divided Supreme Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering – the
formation of voting districts based on the preferences of the controlling party in the state
legislature – is a political question that cannot be reviewed by federal courts. The 5-4 ruling
was split on ideological grounds, with the Court’s five conservative members making up the
majority.
Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice said that while gerrymandering leads to outcomes
that may seem “reasonably unjust,” adding that the legislature is better equipped to handle
the matter. Liberals argue that partisan gerrymandering has led to unbreakable Republican
strongholds in states like Wisconsin and North Carolina, where despite amassing more
Democratic votes statewide, the majority of seats still go to Republicans.
In a scathing dissent on behalf of the liberal wing of the Court, one justice wrote, “Of all
times to abandon the Court's duty to declare the law, this was not the one.”
120

2 - Neutral Story:
Supreme Court Rules Partisan Gerrymandering Not Reviewable by Federal Courts
On Friday, the Supreme Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering – the formation of voting
districts based on the preferences of the controlling party in the state legislature – is not
reviewable by federal courts. The ruling was 5-4.
Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice said partisan gerrymandering presents a “question
beyond the reach of the federal courts,” adding that the legislature is better equipped to
handle the matter. He added that the courts have no legal authority to manage or direct the
political parties in their actions.
The ruling does not keep the federal courts from considering other cases of alleged
gerrymandering in the future.
3 - Control Story:
Supreme Court Closes for Renovations
On Friday, the U.S. Supreme Court will close for a renovation of the building.
According to Supreme Court staff, the building will be undergoing a number of changes in
the coming months, including new flooring and ceiling fixtures. A new raised Bench will also
be installed, replacing the winged Bench installed in 1972.
In addition to the courtroom, the Supreme Court houses offices for justices and their staff, a
dining room, and a library with more than 500,000 volumes.
The Court is expected to re-open in late September.
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